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AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF 
LAWS MAKING CRIMINAL ACTS OF 
FORNICATION AND COHABITATION; 
TOGETHER WITH OCCASIONAL REMARKS 
UPON THE NOTION THAT THE 
CONSTITUTION 
PROTECTS A RIGHT OF PRIVACY; 
AS WELL AS SOME SPECULATIONS 
ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THAT RIGHT 
AND THE MOURNFUL IDSTORY 
OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, 
FROM WHICH IT WAS INFERRED 
252 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prostitution may be our oldest profession; fornication is 
surely among our oldest crimes.1 The crime of fornication was a 
preoccupation of the legal system in the earliest colonies2 and as 
late as the period directly preceding the Revolutionary War occa-
sioned 210 of the 370 criminal prosecutions in one Massachusetts 
L Indeed, the word "fornication" derives from the Latin for brothel (/ornix). 1 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1061 (1971). Like most glib beginnings, however, this one 
must be somewhat qualified. The Bible, of course, frequently and vigorously condemns 
fornication. E.g., Acts 15:20. Fornication was not a common-law crime, but like much 
sexual behavior, it could be punished by the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of Eng-
land. M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw 138 (1951). But, Professor Ploscowe reports, "[T]he 
record of the Ecclesiastical Courts in the enforcement of sexual morality was largely one 
of failure." Id. For a general and historical discussion of fornication as a crime, see id. at 
136-57. 
2. Professor Demos, for instance, reports "a steady succession of trials and convic-
tions for sexual offenses involving single persons" in Plymouth Colony. J. DEMOS, A LrITLE 
COMMONWEALTH 152 (paperback ed. 1972). 
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county.3 It remains a crime in fifteen states and the District of 
Columbia:4 States have also sought to prevent fornication by 
making it Hlegal for unmarried men and women to live together. 
Cohabitation in this sense is illegal in sixteen states.n Today 
laws regulating fornication and cohabitation are as honored in 
the breach as in the observance,6 and economics has joined lust 
as a motive for crime-couples whose pensions or alimony will 
be cut off or reduced upon marriage sometimes resort to non-
marital cohabitation. 7 It has been estimated that six to eight 
million people are cohabiting without benefit of clergy and that 
the number of such couples increased from 1960 to 1970 by over 
700 percent. 8 
The same period which has seen a higher rate of cohabitation 
has also seen considerable and significant litigation which can be 
read as casting doubt on the constitutionality of laws regulating 
consensual adult sexual activity. The Supreme Court's modern 
treatment of that issue began in 1961 with Justice Harlan's pre-
scient dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 9 in which he attacked the consti-
tutionality of a statute making it a crime for married couples to 
use contraceptives. When four years later the Court in Griswold 
3. The period was 1760 to 1774, the county was Middlesex. Nelson, Emerging Notions 
of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 450, 452 (1967). 
4. A.LA. CODE tit. 13, § 8-1 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26· 
2010 (1977); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1948) (reenacted by Act of March 27, 1972, ch. 336, § 
1, 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws 844); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); 
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § is (Michie/Law Co-op. 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 
(1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-08 (1976); R.l. GEN. 
LAws § 11-6-3 (1969); s.c. CODE § 16-15-60 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1978): 
VA. CODE§ 18.2-344 (1975); W. VA. CoDE § 61-8-3 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 644.15 (West 
1958); D.C. CoDE § 22-1002 (1973). 
5. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 8-1 (1975); A.LASKA STAT. § 11.40.040 (1970); Amz. REV. STAT. 
§ 13-1409 (1978); FLA. STAT. § 798.02 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-6604 (1948) (reenacted by 
Act of March 27, 1972, ch. 336, § 1, 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws 844); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 
11-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 23-118 (1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 
16 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1968); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.335 (1970); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-
29-1 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 30-10-2 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-10 (1976); s.c. 
CODE§ 16-15-60 (1976) (definition of fornication includes cohabitation); VA. CODE§ 18.2-
345 (1975); W. VA. CODE§ 61-8-4 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 944.20 (West 1958) (lewd and 
lascivious behavior includes cohabitation that implied sexual intercourse). 
6. See note 97 infra. 
7. Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62VA. L. REV, 
663, 686-87 (1976). 
8. Id. (citing Boston Evening Globe, May 26, 1976, at 2, cols. 1-6): M. KING, COHABI-
TATION HANDBOOK 2 (1975). The Census Bureau estimates there has been a 100% increase 
since 1970. TIME, Nov. 21, 1977, at 111. Since not all states outlaw fornication or cohabita-
tion, not all these couples are breaking the law. And, of course, a higher incidence of 
cohabitation is no sure indication that more couples are breaking fornication laws. 
9. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961). 
December 1978] Note-Cohabitation 255 
v. Connecticut10 ruled that such a statute was indeed unconstitu-
tional as an invasion of a right of privacy protected by the four-
teenth amendment, the search began for the boundaries of that 
right. 11 Decisions extending the right to use contraceptives to the 
unmarried 12 and establishing a right to abortions13 heartened 
those who believed that the boundaries enclosed at least consen-
sual adult sexual activity. Some lower state courts have nurtured 
this hope by striking down sodomy laws on the ground that "the 
right of privacy in sexual conduct between consenting adults is 
fundamental, " 14 although only two state supreme courts have so 
held. 15 Meanwhile, commentators have seized with energy and 
enthusiasm on the expansive language in some Supreme Court 
opinions and have advocated a liberally defined right of sexual 
privacy.16 
Nevertheless, while the Court has not limned precisely the 
perimeters of the right of sexual privacy, it has repeatedly con-
firmed in dicta the state's right to regulate sexual conduct.17 And, 
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
11. See, e.g., Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH. 
L. REv. 197 (1965); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.L. REv. 
1, 8-9 (1972). 
12. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
14. State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, 1151 (1975), revd. sub nom. 
State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,547 P.2d 6 (1976). Accord, State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 
539 P.2d 207 (1975), revd., 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976). 
15. State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200,381 
A.2d 333 (1977). 
16. E.g., L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886-990 (1978); Wilkinson & White, 
Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563 (1977); Note, 
The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 
1613 (1974). 
17. In his often cited dissent in Poe, Justice Harlan wrote, "I would not suggest that 
adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, how-
ever privately practiced." 367 U.S. at 552. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in 
Griswold (in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined) noted that the 
constitutionality of Connecticut's statutes forbidding adultery and fornication was 
"beyond doubt." 381 U.S. at 498. In declining to find that the Constitution "incorporates 
the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is always beyond state 
regulation," the Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), cited 
Southern Surety Co. v. Oklahoma, 241 U.S. 582, 586 (1916), "as to fornication." 413 U.S. 
at 68 n.15. (The Court was evidently referring to the statement in Southern Surety that 
"[a]dultery is an offense against the marriage relation and belongs to the class of subjects 
which each state controls in its own way.") Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398-99 
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment): 
In my view, analysis must start from the recognition of domestic relations as 
"an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the 
States." . . . The State, representing the collective expression of moral aspirations, 
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in a delphic summary affirmance, 18 the Court sustained a three-
judge federal court's refusal to declare Virginia's sodomy statute 
unconstitutional when applied to active, regular, consensual, 
adult, private homosexual relations. 19 That affirmance has been 
taken to indicate that the state may indeed significantly regulate 
sexual behavior.20 Most recently, the Court voted seven to two not 
to hear a case which might have permitted the Court to ponder 
these uncertainties. 21 Certainly the net result of the Court's dicta 
and decisions is that no lawyer asked by clients about the consti-
tutionality of a state fornication or cohabitation statute can coun-
sel with confidence. 
This Note begins with the indisputable assumption that laws 
prohibiting fornication and cohabitation are nowhere explioitly 
forbidden by the Constitution. If a right to engage in consensual 
adult heterosexual activity exists, it will most convincingly be 
inferred from the Court's cases establishing a right of "privacy." 
The Note first seeks to discover an adequate definition of privacy 
which might lead to a decision whether "privacy" encompasses 
the right .to fornicate or cohabit (a right which, for brevity's 
sake, we will somewhat imprecisely call the right to, sexual pri-
vacy), but it finds no such definition. The Note therefore pro-
ceeds to investigate the Court's usual test for fundamental rights, 
a test which calls for the Court to look to society's traditions and 
has an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic relations reflect 
the widely held values of its people. 
18. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
19. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
20. E.g., Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: Closing the Door to a Funda, 
mental Right of Sexual Privacy, 53 DEN. L.J. 553 (1976). But see text accompanying notes 
61-69 infra. 
21. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 99 S.CT. 734 (1978). Justice Brennan 
noted he would grant certiorari; Justice Marshall wrote a dissent. In fact, the case was a 
good deal less than an ideal vehicle for a Court which wished to address the problem of 
regulating consensual adult sexual activity. Ms. Hollenbaugh, a librarian in a public 
library, had been fired for living with the library's janitor and their illegitimate child. The 
Court might simply have held, as a district court had held in Mindel v. United States 
Civil Serv. Commn., 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970), that the employee's sexual 
conduct was simply too unrelated to her work to be a legitimate ground for dismissal, 
especially since, as in Mindel, her work had not been unsatisfactory. 99 S.CT. at 737. C'f. 
Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975) (rule barring 
employment of unwed parents in school system insufficiently related to any legitmate 
objective to satisfy equal protection clause); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 
F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (despite contractual provision that a teacher may be fired 
for "immorality," cancellation of a teacher's employment contract on evidence growing 
out of her consultation with a doctor about an abortion is an unconstitutional violation of 
privacy). Nor was the propriety of laws regulating fornication directly involved, since 
Pennsylvania had repealed both its fornication and adultery statutes. 99 S.CT. at 735. 
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collective conscience. But those two criteria, the Note argues, 
likewise tell us little about any right to sexual privacy. The defini-
tional and historical approaches having failed, the Note must 
resort to inquiry by analogy. The Note thus proceeds to state and 
test several hypotheses by which the right to sexual privacy might 
be justified. The Note contends that what it calls the right to 
marital privacy, especially when regarded in the light of the other 
kinds of privacy, provides an adequate analogy for a right to 
sexual privacy. 
But that a right is fundamental does not mean that a law 
which conflicts with that right is, ipso facto, unconstitutional, for 
such a law is permissible if it is narrowly drawn to serve a compel-
ling state interest. The Note examines the state interests which 
laws forbidding fornication and cohabitation might serve. The 
Note suggests that several of these interests are indeed 
"compelling," but that the best evidence-the behavior of the 
states which have enacted but rarely enforced these laws-shows 
that the laws are hardly necessary to achieve those interests. The 
Note ultimately concludes, then, that laws prohibiting fornica-
tion and cohabitation are unconstitutional. 
I. THE CREATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS RIGHT 
To chronicle the development of the Court's decisions on 
sexual and familial privacy would be wasteful and ridiculous ex-
cess: it has often been done before.22 Nevertheless, a glance at a 
few of the salient cases is necessary to discover whether the Court 
has developed a definition we could simply consult to learn 
whether consensual adult heterosexual activity is constitutionally 
protected. However, while that glance reveals no such definition, 
it does reveal some origins of the ambiguities of the right to sexual 
privacy and the concerns and uncertainties which underlie the 
Court's privacy opinions, and which must inform our evaluation 
of any right to sexual privacy. 
A. The Background 
A specter haunted the Griswold Court-the specter of 
Lochner. Lochner u. New York, 23 of course, is the celebrated case 
in which the Supreme Court declared a New York law limiting 
bakery employees' working hours an unconstitutional interfer-
22. E.g., L. TruBE, supra note 16, at 886-990; Wilkinson & White, supra note 16; Note, 
On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670 (1973). 
23. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
258 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:252 
ence with the right to contract: "The general right to make a 
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution."24 The case symbolizes what is now commonly 
perceived as a misuse of the fourteenth amendment and of the 
power of judicial review to annul legislation inimical to the 
Court's social and economic beliefs even where that legislation 
offends no explicit constitutional provision.2.,; Critics of Lochner 
thought it dangerous not simply because it seemed insecurely 
grounded in the Constitution, but because of the practical diffi-
culties of identifying the kinds of rights the fourteenth amend-
ment does protect, its consequently limitless reach, and the con-
siderable power that reach gives the Court. Thus Justice Black, 
who had left the United States Senate for the Court in 1937, when 
Lochner was a live and bitter memory to liberal politicans, char-
acterized the formulas used to identify fourteenth amendment 
rights as reincarnations of old "natural justice" notions, 28 and he 
summoned up Justice Iredell's 1798 attack on that doctrine: 
24. 198 U.S. at 53. 
25. This roughly paraphrases Justice Holmes's dissenting remarks in Baldwin v, 
Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1930). Justice Holmes did not deny that the fourteenth 
amendment could be the basis for an attack on a law if it could be said "that a rational 
and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamen-
tal principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law." 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an example of 
the Court's own criticism of Lochner, see Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 
421, 423 (1952), where, after referring to Lochner, the Court said, "Our recent decisions 
make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation." 
But see Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some lnter.~ections 
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 231-32 (1968): 
It might be argued that, if the function of the Court is truly to afford our society 
an opportunity for "sober second thought" concerning measures that challenge, in 
some significant way, either cherished ideals or deep-rooted social beliefs, then the 
actions of the thirties [the high-water mark of economic substantive due process] 
were thoroughly in accord with that function . . . . [T]he effect of the Court's 
decisions was precisely to impress upon the society the magnitude of the departure 
from received tradition entailed by acceptance of the view that there exist no 
principled checks on governmental economic actions . . . • Even on a less long-
range view, it is apparent that the Court's 1930's decisions performed the task of 
legitimation that the cumbersomeness of the machinery for amending the Constitu-
tion has historically imposed upon the Court. Thus, the public consensus on the 
propriety of the economic legislation of the 1930's was ultimately strengthened, not 
weakened, as a result of the Court's intervention. 
26. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). See 
generally L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten 
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN, L. REV, 
843 (1978). 
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The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the 
ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all 
that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that 
the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed 
an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with 
the abstract principles of natural justice. 27 
In short, the substantive due process doctrine symbolized by 
Lochner invited an extension of judicial power bordering on usur-
pation, and many felt the Court accepted the invitation in invali-
dating New Deal legislation in the 1930s. 28 
The modern Court's problem, in light of Lochner and its kin, 
was to formulate a statement of the right of privacy (1) with a 
sturdy constitutional foundation and (2) expressed in language 
broad enough to dignify and secure a "fundamental" right but 
narrow enough to provide principled limits to the growth of the 
concept.29 The two requirements, of course, are interrelated. A 
sharp delineation of the constitution.al authority for the right of 
privacy may furnish the necessary principles for controlling the 
right's growth. And logic broad enough to appear to our sense of 
the nation's basic values but convincingly and safely limited may 
make the constitutional argument more persuasive. 
Formulating any right from the doctrine of substantive due 
process would have been difficult, but formulating the right of 
privacy was especially so. The first criterion-constructing the 
sturdy constitutional foundation-had more than its usual per-
plexities, as we shall see. But especially, once the Court decided 
to describe the right to freedom from interference with the inti-
mate affairs of one's life (insofar, of course, as that is a "right") 
under the deceptively simple and irresistibly appealing rubric 
"privacy," it intensified its problems with the second criterion. 
First, the Court had chosen a word whose popular connotations 
did not always coincide with its legal denotations.30 Second, the 
Court had already used the word in several other contexts.31 
Third, partly because of the two previous characteristics, 
"privacy becomes too greedy a legal concept," as Paul Freund has 
27. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,399 (1798), quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 525 (1965). . 
28. For background and citations to further material, see L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 
427-55. 
29. "An unrestricted concept is perhaps no concept at all." Gerety, Redefining 
Privacy, 12 liARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 261 (1977). 
30. For an example of the consequences of this fact, see text at note 59 infra. 
31. See, e.g., the categories analyzed in Bostwick, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, 
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1447 (1976). 
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written, one which "might give excessive protection to an interest 
in human dignity and sensitivity."32 Whatever the difficulties of 
meeting the first requirement may commonly be, in the case of 
the right of privacy the search for broad yet safely limited lan-
guage and logic-in short, for a limiting principle-has been the 
overriding task. 
These ambiguities and complexities, then, make the con-
tours of the right of privacy unusually obscure. This Note's quest 
is to learn whether a right of privacy meeting the two criteria 
described above would encompass nonmarital heterosexual activ-
ity. 
B. A Discursive History of the Right 
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Griswold sought to 
exorcise the ghost of Lochner by explicitly declining any invita-
tion to be guided by that case,33 by explaining in non-Lochner 
terms precedents founded on Lochner principles, 34 and by con-
cluding that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have pen-
umbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance";35 in particular that the first, third, 
fourth, fifth, and (evidently) ninth amendments "create zones of 
privacy."36 Justice Douglas's device may seem to anchor substan-
tive due process cases more firmly in a constitutional text, but it 
may not offer the specific standards needed to provide plausible 
limits to the right of privacy: rights emerging from the shadowy 
peripheries of more specific rights often evade exact definition; 
vivid but vague expressions like "zones of privacy" are snares for 
the analytically unwary;37 "privacy," as Justice Black com-
plained, "is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can 
. . easily be interpreted as . . . many things . . . ";38 and two 
32. Freund, Privacy, in PRIVACY 192 (1971). 
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965). 
34. 381 U.S. at 482-83. 
35. 381 U.S. at 484. 
36. 381 U.S. at 484. 
37. Cf. text at notes 226-28 infra (criticizing analysis in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)). 
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaran-
teed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee 
another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning. 
381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting.) 
The privacy cases pose the Lochner problem poignantly for many justices and com-
mentators who find the legislation under review particularly obnoxious. As Justice Black 
protested in his dissent in Griswold, "I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am 
December 1978] Note-Cohabitation 261 
of the leading components of privacy...:....the right to individual 
autonomy and the right to control the disclosure of information 
about one's self-would, sufficiently extended, foreclose govern-
ment regulation of the individual altogether. Since Justice Doug-
las sought to justify an expansion of the Constitution's protection, 
he marshalled the grandest possible language, but the grander 
the language, the more irresistible becomes a limitless extension 
of the principles of the case. 
The next major case in the sexual privacy sequence, 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 39 did little to clarify the ambiguities of 
Griswold. Baird affirmed the reversal of a proponent of contra-
ception's conviction under a statute making it a crime to give 
away any drug or article for the prevention of conception except 
to a married person under the prescription of a physician. Apply-
ing the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the 
Court found that no "ground of difference . . . rationally explains 
the different treatment accorded married and unmarried per-
sons" under the Massachusetts statute.40 Much of the opinion is 
addressed to demonstrating that the statute's purpose could not 
be to serve the state's interest in prohibiting fornication or pre-
serving public health; the intriguing differences between tlie facts 
of Griswold and Baird were less thoroughly handled. First, ema-
nations from the fourth amendment's guarantees against unrea-
sonable searches had helped justify the decision in Griswold, 
where Justice Douglas, after stressing that amendment's protec-
tion "against all the governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a 
man's home and the privacies of life,' " 41 asked rhetorically, 
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of 
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?"42 
But in Baird the arrest was made on a public platform at the close 
of a speech.43 Indeed, to Justice Douglas, it was "a simple First 
Amendment case" of protected speech. 44 
nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited 
by some specific constitutional provision." 381 U.S. at 510. 
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
40. 405 U.S. at 447. 
41. 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
42. 381 U.S. at 485. 
43. 405 U.S. at 457 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
44. 405 U.S. at 455 (Douglas, J., concurring). "Handing an article under discussion 
to a member of the audience is a technique known to all teachers . . . . I do not see how 
we can have a Society of the Dialogue, which the First Amendment envisages, if time-
honored teaching techniques are barred to those who give educational lectures." 405 U.S. 
at 460. 
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Second, Griswold concerned a law which, "in forbidding the 
use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or 
sale, seeks to achieve its goals" by over broad means. 4G The law in 
Baird regulated the sale of contraceptives.46 Finally, the opinion 
in Griswold relied greatly on the special qualities of the marital 
relationship, which Justice Douglas's encomium described as 
ancient, sacred, and noble.47 If these qualities are what place 
marriage in the zone of protected privacy, are they not a "ground 
of difference" which might explain the disparate treatment ac-
corded married and unmarried couples?48 The Court in Baird 
conceded the difficulty, but explained it away in a· manner sug-
gesting that the phrase "right of privacy" had ceased to be a mere 
collection of emanations and taken on independent life. As Jus-
tice Brennan wrote for the Court (in a passage to be quoted in 
almost every subsequent argument for an expanded right of sex-
ual privacy): 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered 
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association 
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 40 
This last sentence introduced a tantalizing new element of the 
right to privacy, the right to autonomy in decisions about matters 
that fundamentally affect one's life. This is obviously a limited 
right, else there could be little scope for government, but the 
opinion did not identify those limits. In short, Baird's detach-
ment from the rationale of Griswold and its emphasis on the right 
45. 381 U.S. at 485 (emphasis original). 
46. 405 U.S. at 440-41. 
47. 381 U.S. at 486. 
48. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standard.~: Some 
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 296 (1973). 
49. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis original). The Court reports that the appellants in a 
later case, Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), argued that since 
Griswold only considered a law governing use, and since Eisenstadt was decided under 
the equal protection clause, "neither case should be treated as reflecting upon the State's 
power to limit or prohibit distribution of contraceptives to any persons, married or unmar• 
ried." 431 U.S. at 686. According to the Carey Court, "The fatal fallacy in this argument 
is that it overlooks the underlying premise of those decisions that the Constitution protects 
'the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion . • • 
into the decision whether to bear or beget a child.'" 431 U.S. at 678 (quoting Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). 
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to make fundamental decisions clouded the constitutional origins 
of the privacy right and opened the door to considerable exten-
sions of it. 
In 1973 the Court in Roe v. Wade50 confronted the emotional 
and active political controversy over state abortion laws and, with 
a stroke of the pen, sought to resolve it. Whatever may be said of 
the almost statutorily detailed description of the state's power to 
regulate abortions, and whatever may be said of the Court's 
lengthy history of abortion legislation, 51 it cannot be said that the 
Court's definition of the privacy rights of a woman seeking an 
abortion clarified the dimensions of the right of privacy generally. 
After citing cases demonstrating that "the Court has recognized 
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas 
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution, "52 and after 
noting that "the right has some extension to activities relating to 
marriage . . . procreation . . . contraception . . . family rela-
tionships . . . and child rearing and education, "53 the Court ab-
ruptly_ held: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, 
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is 
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.54 
The brief ensuing (and apparently explanatory) remarks empha-
sized the distress of the woman who bears an unwanted child. If 
this was meant to justify a privacy right, it was inadequate, since 
all social regulation imposes distress, if only by preventing people 
from doing as they wish. A privacy right exists not because people 
would suffer distress without it, but because the distress is a kind 
which the Constitution protects people from having to suffer. 55 
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
51. For criticisms of both of these aspects of the opinion, see, e.g., Ely, The Wages 
of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973). 
52. 410 U.S. at 152. 
53. 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
54. 410 U.S. at 153. 
55. Roe has been widely criticized on this score. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 51, at 931-
32: "[T]he Court provides neither an alternative definition nor an account of why it 
thinks privacy is involved. It simply announces that the right to privacy 'is broad enough 
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' Nor is 
criticism confined to commentators. Justice White, dissenting in Roe and its companion 
case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973), wrote: "I find nothing in the language or 
history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions 
and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers .... " Justice Rehnquist 
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Thus in Roe the Court identified the constitutional origin of the 
right of privacy as the fourteenth amendment without making the 
outlines of that right much plainer. 
However, in the same term in which the Court enlarged 
"privacy" in Roe, it was staking limits to the concept in an ob-
scenity case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton. 56 The Court held 
that there is no privacy right to watch obscene movies in a public 
theater, though the Court did not overrule its announcement in 
Stanley v. Georgia57 of a right to have such movies in one's home. 
The Court in Paris analyzed the privacy right as encompassing 
"the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, 
motherhood, procreation, and child-rearing."58 The Court allowed 
the nonconstitutional connotations of "privacy" to affect consti-
tutional interpr~tation when it rationalized the refusal "to com-
pare a theater open to the public for a fee, with the private home 
of Stanley ... and the marital bedroom of Griswold ... " by 
noting that the Court "has, on numerous occasions, refused to 
hold that commercial ventures such as a motion-picture house are 
'private' for the purpose of civil rights litigation and civil rights 
statutes."59 The classification of theaters under civil rights laws, 
however, tells us little about the -usefulness of the comparison 
with the home or bedroom. In a subsequent footnote, the Court 
depreciated the importance of places in determining the range of 
constitutional privacy which, the Court said, "is not just con-
cerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate 
relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor's of-
fice, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safe-
guard the right of intimacy involved."60 But if Paris represented 
the Court's unwillingness to develop analogies to the zones of 
privacy surrounding the home and the marital bedroom and its 
willingness to confine the right of privacy to "personal intima-
cies" or "intimate relationships," the case provided the Court no 
opportunity to comment on what might constitute a personal 
intimacy or an intimate relationship, or the degree to which ei-
ther might be protected. 
Such an opportunity was presented and declined in Doe v. 
joined Justice White's dissent and, writing for himself, had difficulty understanding how 
the right of privacy was involved in Roe. 410 U.S. 113, 172. 
56. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
57. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
58. 413 U.S. at 65. 
59. 413 U.S. at 65. 
60. 413 U.S. at 66 n.13. 
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Commonwealth's Attorney. 61 Doe was an action by homosexuals 
for a declaratory judgment that Virginia's sodomy law was uncon-
stitutional. A three-judge federal district court denied relief, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. Both the Justices 
and the commentators have disputed precisely what that sum-
mary affirmance means. Some commentators have proposed that 
the case was decided solely on standing or ripeness grounds, 62 a 
suggestion perhaps made plausible by the Court's observation in 
Carey v. Population Services International that "the Court has 
not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to 
what extent th~ Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating 
[private consensual sexual] behavior among adults."83 But in his 
dissent in Carey, Justice Rehnquist responded, "While we have 
not ruled on every conceivable regulation affecting such conduct, 
the facial constitutional validity of criminal statutes prohibiting 
certain consensual acts has been definitively established. Doe v. 
Commonwealth's Attorney .... "84 
Even if we knew that the Doe Court was directly affirming 
the lower court's opinion, we would know little, since that opinion 
is singularly uninformative. It quoted at length Justice Harlan's 
dissent in 1961 in Poe v. Ullman, 85 especially those passages con-
trasting "the intimacy of husband and wife" with homosexuality 
and other sexual "intimacies which the law has always forbidden 
and which can have no claim to social protection. "88 The court's 
61. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg. mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge 
court). 
62. "It may well be argued, in future discussions of Doe, that the plaintiffs' relatively 
weak showing of ripeness and standing-none of the plaintiffs was indicted or con-
victed-prompted the Supreme Court majority to affirm without hearing arguments or 
handing down an opinion." Gerety, supra note 29, at 280 n.172. See generally Note, Doe 
v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 123 (1976); Comment, supra note 20. 
63. 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977). 
64. 431 U.S. at 678 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Summary affirmances are precedents, as Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-44 
(1975), holds, but they are "not of the same precedential value as an opinion of this Court 
treating the question on the merits." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). In 
particular, the reasoning of the lower court is not necessarily confirmed by a summary 
affirmance. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
65. 367 U.S. at 522. 
66. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (E.D. Va. 1975) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
553 (1961)) (emphasis added by the district court). The court continued: 
Justice Harlan's words are nonetheless commanding merely because they were 
written in dissent. To begin with . . . they were authentically approved in Griswold 
[ where part of the-quotation used by the court was approvingly cited in Justice 
Goldberg's concurring opinion]. Moreover, [Justice Harlan] was not differing with 
the majority [in Poe] on the merits of the substantive case but only as to the 
procedural reason of its dismissal. At all events, the Justice's exegesis is that of a 
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opinion did not ask whether the development of the right of pri-
vacy in Griswold, Baird, and Roe v. Wade might cause one to 
reconsider the dicta of a superseded dissent, however prescient 
and distinguished. 67 The court's flat assertion that homosexuality 
"is obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life" ignored 
possible analogies with "marriage, home or family life"68 and the 
other aspects of privacy the Supreme Court has identified. 69 In 
sum, given the many uncertainties surrounding the summary af-
firmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, it establishes no 
clear, reliable, limiting principles to the right of privacy. 
The Court, we have seen, has associated concerns such as 
marriage, the family, and procreation with the right of privacy. 
But the .Court has found no definition of privacy which might 
guide an inquiry into whether a particular activity is so related 
to those concerns that it comes within a constitutionally pro-
tected zone of privacy. 
II. PRIVACY AND FuNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
A. The Test for Fundamental Rights 
The foregoing discussion of the Court's attempts to define 
"privacy" illustrates the difficulties in identifying limiting princi-
ples of Freund's "greedy" concept.70 The device on which consti-
tutional analysis primarily relies to separate the trivial from the 
protected is a device required by the principles commonly used 
to interpret the fourteenth amendment. The device is in the form 
of an argument, spelled out with some precision in Justice Har-
lan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 71 It runs as follows. The fourteenth 
amendment speaks in terms of process and might therefore re-
quire only procedural fairness. 72 But the Court has not interpreted 
the amendment so narrowly: 
Were due process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to 
reach those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the 
jurist of widely acknowledged superior stature and weighty whatever its context, 
403 F. Supp. at 1201. It is hard to determine in what sense Justice Harlan's comments 
were "authentically approved in Griswold." Justice Goldberg was writing a concurring 
opinion for himself and two other justices. 
67. See Comment, supra note 20. 
68. See Part 11.B.4 infra. 
69. See Parts 11.B.3 & 11.B.5 infra. 
70. Freund, supra note 32, at 192. 
71. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961). 
72. 367 U.S. at 540. 
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future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in applica-
tion to individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all 
three.73 
But the fourteenth amendment is not just "a shorthand reference 
to what is explicitly set out elsewhere in the Bill of Rights. "74 The 
reach of fourteenth amendment due process is spelled out by 
"those concepts which are considered to embrace those rights 
'which are . . . fundamental; which belong . . . to the citizens 
of all free governments,' for 'the purposes [ of securingl which 
men enter into society.' "75 But "[ d]ue process has not been 
reduced to any formula." 76 
The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's 
decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built 
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has 
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized soci-
ety. . . . The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by 
this country, having regard to what history teaches are the tradi-
tions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which 
it broke. That tradition is a living thing.77 
Another influential statement of the mechan_ism for identifying 
rights protected by the due process clause is found in Justice 
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut. 18 
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left 
at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private J:!.O-
tions. Rather, they must look to the "traditions and [collective] 
conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so 
rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental." The inquiry 
is whether a right involved "is of such a character that it cannot 
be denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions'. . . . "79 
A final, frequently cited formulation of the test is Justice Har-
lan's in his concurring opinion in Griswold: "[T]he proper con-
stitutional inquiry . . . is whether this . . . statute infringes the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of or-,_ 
dered liberty' .... "so _ 
73. 367 U.S. at 541. 
74. 367 U.S. at 541. 
75. 367 U.S. at 541 (emphasis original) (citations omitted). 
76. 367 U.S. at 542. 
77. 367 U.S. at 542. 
78. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
79. 381 U.S. at 493 (citations omitted). 
80. 381 U.S. at 500 (citations omitted). 
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This admonition to consult history and a Jungian collective 
conscience is a conjuration against one of the hobgoblins of 
Lochner-judicial subjectivism81-but its efficacy is dubious. 
There is a long and honorable American tradition of invoking 
history to justify social and legal programs, 82 and the Court must, 
of course, rationalize past principles and presen~ policies. 83 But 
for identifying aspects of privacy worthy of constitutional protec-
tion, nothing in "history" is so precise or uncontroverted as to 
provide reliable guidance.84 As Justice Black mordantly com-
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Griswold apparently relies not on the theory 
outlined above, but on the proposition that the Bill of Rights is made applicable to the 
states by the fourteenth amendment and that the emanations of the Bill of Rights are 
likewise applicable. Justice Harlan interpreted and criticized the opinion by Justice Doug-
las: 
[W]hat I find implicit in the Court's opinion is that the "incorporation" doctrine 
may be used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. For me 
this is just as unacceptable constitutional doctrine as is the use of the 
"incorporation" approach to impose upon the States all the requirements of the Bill 
of Rights as found in the provisions of the first eight amendments and in the 
decisions of this Court interpreting them. 
. . . While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radia-
tions. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opin-
ion, on its own bottom. 
381 U.S. at 500 (emphasis original). The question whether the fourteenth amendment 
incorporates the entire Bill of Rights has not been finally resolved, but the fundamental 
rights approach outlined in the text has become the means by which the Court typically 
discovers protected privacy rights. This seems to be what the Court was suggesting in Roe 
v. Wade: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's con-
cept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as 
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to 
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy. 
410 U.S. at 153. Thus while the Court may use portions of the Bill of Rights to help identify 
values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," it follows the process outlined by 
Justice Harlan to discover liberties protected by the due process clause. Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
It is worth noting that even Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold implicitly embraced 
the proposition that tradition, history, and our collective conscience help define the due 
process clause: "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than 
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage . . • is an association for as 
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), 
81. Thus Justice Harlan wrote, "If the supplying of content to this Constitutional 
concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges 
have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them." Poe v, Ullman, 367 
U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting). Similarly, we have seen that Justice Goldberg's con-
curring opinion in Griswold noted: "In determining which rights are fundamental, judges 
are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions," 381 U.S. 
479, 493 (1965). 
82. See, e.g., C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 180-81 (1969). 
83. See id. at 193. 
84. Even leaving aside all the modem doubts about whether history has any discover-
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mented, "['Ijhe scientific miracles of this age have not yet pro-
duced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what tradi-
tions are rooted in the '[collective] conscience of our people.' "85 
In fact, the most common "historical" technique is simply to list 
the major privacy cases with brief notations of the rights they are 
thought to recognize. 88 The most extensive and purely historical 
inquiry is Justice Blackmun's excursion in Roe v. Wade, 81 an 
application of the "history and collective conscience" test that 
suggests some reasons for the Court's restrained enthusiasm for 
it. One imponderable, when seeking to divine the collective con-
science and tra~itions of our people, is which conscience, which 
traditions? Justice Blackmun's opinion in Ro·e devotes approxi-
mately fourteen pages to demonstrating that abortion laws "are 
of relatively recent vintage . . . deriv[ing] from statutory 
changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th 
century."88 To Justice Blackmun, the significance of this was, 
apparently, that "at the time of the adoption of our Constitution 
. . . a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate 
a pregnancy than she does in most States today."89 To Justice 
Rehnquist: 
The fact that a majority of the states reflecting, after all, the 
majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abor-
tions for at least a century is a strong indication . . . that the 
asserted right to an abortion is not "so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."80 
To Justice Blackmun, the relative novelty of abortion legislation 
made irrelevant the passage of laws regulating abortion in each 
of the fifty states. But to Justice Rehnquist, "the very existence 
of the debate [over abortion] is evidence that the 'right' to an 
able meaning, the history of the Court's use of history is not specially comforting. See 
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. And lest one 
should suppose that that misuse is unique to the judicial mind, one should examine D. 
FISHER, HISTORIAN'S FALLACIES (1970). (Fisher does not suppose that history is without its 
uses, and his book is hopefully subtitled Tow ARD A Lome OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT, but his 
acidulous comments on distinguished historians are cautionary.) 
85. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 519 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
86. E.g., Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion). An exception is Justice 
Brennan's concurring opinion in Moore, which was written to underscore the "cultural 
myopia" of the statute in question and which explored the history and sociology of the 
extended family in America. 431 U.S. at 506. 
87. 410 U.S. 113, 129-43 (1973). 
88. 410 U.S. at 129. 
89. 410 U.S. at 140. 
90. 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., disenting). 
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abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellant would 
have us believe. "91 
Justice Rehnquist surely has the better of the argument as 
framed by Justice Blackmun-if we ask what the traditions and 
conscience of our people, as expressed in our laws, say about 
abortion, is not the most recent century the mo~t relevant, and 
is not a century of clear legislation enough? But ifwe ask whether 
our traditions and conscience include a sense of the inviolability 
of one's person, or the conviction that people ought to be free to 
choose whether to have children, the holding in Roe v. Wade is 
easier to defend. In other words, we must consult general underly-
ing values rather than the specific legislation which provoked the 
constitutional challenge. This of course requires a disturbingly 
problematic search for nonlegislative evidence of our tradition 
and conscience, but without such a flexible, multi-faceted in-
quiry, the dimensions of constitutionally protected privacy 
would be far more cramped than the cases permit, and the 
"living Constitution" would have a tenuous hold on life. The 
need for sensitive, wide-ranging inquiry into traditions is 
especially pressing in privacy cases, since perceptions about what 
is private and intimate change with the era and the culture.92 
Further, a simple majoritarian, count-the-statutes solution is a 
particularly inapt gauge of the legitimacy of a privacy right, since 
constitutional privacy guards the right to make choices in the 
protected area without the knowledge, or at least without the 
supervision, of the majority-that the majority wishes to inter-
vene should not be dispositive, nor has it been in cases like Roe 
v. Wade. 
The problems sketched in the preceding paragraph suggest 
the extreme difficulties of any attempt to locate in our national 
conscience or tradition some strain that would constitutionally 
discredit laws regulating consensual, adult, private, heterosexual 
activity. There have been laws making fornication criminal since 
our national memory runneth not to the contrary. 93 Yet, by the 
end of the colonial period, even jurisdictions like Massachusetts, 
which had prosecuted fornicators with single-minded vigor, 94 had 
substantially abandoned such prosecutions. 95 One doubts that 
Bay Staters had become chaste: Professor Shorter reports 
91. 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
92. See, inter alia, D. F'LAHERTY, PruvACY IN COLONIAL AMErucA 19 (1972). 
93. See text at notes 1-3 supra. 
94. See note 3 supra. 
95. Nelson, supra note 3, at 456. 
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that from 1750-1850 "the number of out-of-wedlock pregnancies 
... skyrocket[ed]" throughout the Western world, indicating a 
pervasive increase in nonmarital sex and constituting "one of the 
central phenomena of modem demographic history."96 If a law is 
more honored in the breach than in the observance, what is the 
tradition?97 On the other hand, if these laws genuinely have 
lapsed into desuetude and disrepute, why are they not repealed? 
An investigation of the traditions respecting fornication and co-
habitation laws thus reveals only inarticulate traditions and an 
ambivalent conscience. 
B. Possible Rationales for "Sexual Privacy" as a Fundamental 
Right 
We have seen that if there is a right to engage in nonmarital, 
heterosexual activity, it is a peculiarly Court-created right whose 
dimensions cannot profitably be sought in either the constitu-
tional text or in history.98 Consequently, the most reliable way to 
establish whether it "exists" may be to compare the kinds of 
personal interests in such behavior with the kinds of interests 
already protected by the Court. The Court's own technique, 
after all, has usually been to leap from historical speculations 
to a recitation· of the privacy cases, to an estimate of whether 
the right sought is in some sense proportionate or proximate to 
the listed rights. 99 Occasionally the Court generalizes briefly, 100 
96. E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE l\40DERN FAMILY 83 (1975). 
97. The law against fornication, when it has not been repealed, has fallen into 
decline, withering away under the impact of mass open defiance, lack of prosecution 
and enforcement, a complete absence of public support, and apathy toward the law 
(including ignorance of it) on the part of the violators. 
D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME AND THE LAw 187 (1977). "Unlike the laws on 
fornication and adultery, those prohibiting open and lewd cohabitation have been en-
forced with occasional vigor, although usually selectively, discriminatorily, and arbitrar-
ily. Such legal actions have become rare ..•. " Id. at 193. 
98. Which is not to say, of course, that such a right does not exist. For a critical review 
of other possible methods of "discovering" a constitutional right; see Ely, The Supreme 
Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1 
(1978). 
99. See Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 
1174 (1974). For typical passages, see Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 
(1977), Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976), and Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 
413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973). 
100. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Kelley v. 
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) ("[e]ach of those cases involved a substantial claim of 
infringement on the individual's freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters 
of procreation, marriage and family life"); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S: 693, 713 (1976); Paris 
Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) ("[t]his privacy right encompasses and 
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but as it conceded in Paul v. Davis, privacy cases defy categorical 
description.1°1 This Note will, nevertheless, next attempt to iso-
late and examine the several arguments which might be made to 
justify the proposition that private, consensual, adult, heterosex-
ual behavior is protected by the Constitution. 
1. Emanations of the Fourth Amendment 
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Griswold v. Connecticut that 
some acts are so intimate and personal that they could be discov-
ered (and thus regulated) by the government only through means 
offensive to the principles underlying the fburth amendment, and 
that those acts therefore fall within a zone of privacy. 
"Secluded from the sight, presence, or intrusion of oth-
ers"102-this phrase defines the colloquial meaning of "private," 
a meaning that is constitutionally acknowledged by a line of cases 
emanating from the fourth amendment's prohibition of 
"unreasonable searches and seizures."103 The most sweeping lan-
guage in these cases is among the earliest. It is from Justice 
Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 104 where, in de-
precating "an unduly literal construction"105 of the fourth amend-
ment, he wrote: 
The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that 
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.108 
The Court's opinion in Griswold depended heavily upon fourth 
protects the personal intimat.!ies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procrea-
tion and child rearing"). 
101. 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). "Even reading the cases cited [in Roe] 'for all they 
are worth,' it is difficult to isolate the 'privacy' factor (or any other factor that seems 
constitutionally relevant) that unites them with each other and with Roe." Ely, supra note 
51, at 932. 
102. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1042 (1969). 
103. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
104. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928). The unduly literal interpretation was that wire-tapping 
was not a search or seizure. The government had conceded that were wire-tapping a search 
or seizure, the instance in Olmstead would have been unreasonable. 
105. 277 U.S. at 476. • 
106. 277 U.S. at 478. 
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amendment cases107 and language.108 But there were other possible 
grounds for the decision in Griswold, and as the Court has ex-
panded the right of privacy it has decreasingly relied on ( to the 
point of ignoring) emanations of the fourth amendment.109 For 
instance, the Court can now suggest that a ban on sales of contra-
ceptives ( which could presumably be enforced without injuring 
fourth amendment principles) "since more easily and less offen-
sively enforced [than a ban on their use], might have an even 
more devastating effect upon the freedom to choose contracep-
tion. "110 And even in cases which fall more precisely within the 
ambit of the right to prevent disclosure of information about one's 
life and behavior, the Court seems reluctant to read the cases and 
law expansively. Thus, in upholding a New York statute which 
required that the state receive a copy of every prescription for 
certain drugs, 111 the Court discounted a claim that "a constitu-
tional privacy right emanates from the Fourth Amendment" by 
commenting that "those cases involve affirmative, unannounced, 
narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the 
course of criminal investigations."112 
Several considerations probably account for the Court's re-
luctance to develop Griswold's fourth amendment aspects and for 
the irrelevance of those aspects to our problem of laws prohibiting 
fornication and cohabitation. The distastefulness of any search 
107. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
108. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms 
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" 381 U.S. at 485. 
109. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684-87 (1977). In his 
dissent in Poe, Justice Harlan foresaw the limitations inherent in tying the right of privacy 
closely to the fourth amendment: "It would surely be an extreme instance of sacrificing 
substance to form were it to be held that the Constitutional principle of privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion comprehends only physical invasions by the police." 367 U.S. 497,551 
(1961). That Griswold is not so limited is argued by Judge Winter: 
The marital right of privacy has a base broader than the Fourth Amendment alone 
and the cases recognizing the right pitch it on grounds that belie that secrecy is a 
necessary element. . • . In Griswold. . . , patients were admitting an outsider into 
their marital intimacies by seeking counseling and advice about contraception 
Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 354 (4th Cir. 1976) (Winter, J., dissenting). 
110. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977). Contrast with this the 
language of the Court in Griswold: "The present case . . . concerns a law which, in 
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, 
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon [the 
marital] relationship." 381 U.S. at 485. 
111. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, (1977). 
112. 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no 
constitutional violation in the circulation to merchants for a flyer listing respondent as a 
shoplifter where charges against him had been dismissed). 
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for evidence of a violation of fornication laws is, of course, plain. 
The image of police bursting into a room to catch a couple in 
flagrante delicto and then relating the episode in open court 
smacks of a sordid divorce, not enlightened law enforcement. 
That is surely what Justice Douglas had in mind when he asked 
in Griswold whether we would have police search the sacred pre-
cincts of the marital bedroom. 113 But much of what made that 
search seem unreasonable in Griswold was the availability of bet-
ter means of serving the proffered state interest, the "policy 
against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relation-
ships .... " 114 Even if a prohibition against contraceptives ac-
tually promotes that end, a ban on sales could be more easily and 
less offensively enforced.115 No such alternatives present them-
selves as means of enforcing fornication laws. Further, the 
searches foreseen in Griswold were only tenuously related to the 
law's purpose. Fornication statutes and the statute in Griswold 
attack the same harm-nonmarital sexual activity. But a convic-
tion following a search for contraceptives would only result in the 
removal of the enticement to sexual promiscuity contraceptives 
were thought to present. In contrast, a search for evidence of 
fornication would be a search for evidence of precisely the behav-
ior the law ultimately seeks to prevent. 
Finally, the Court's desertion of the fourth amendment ar-
gument is probably due to the indirectness with which that argu-
ment speaks to society's basic, genuine concerns in privacy cases. 
The crucial feature of privacy cases is the special quality of the 
protected behavior. The fourth amendment does little to identify 
any special qualities of sexual activity which call for constitu-
tional protection-they must be inferred from other constitu-
tional sources. Once its special qualities are identified, freedom 
to engage in sexual activity can be protected solely on the basis 
of those qualities and without relying on the fourth amendment's 
emanations. If anything, courts now seem to take this aspect of 
privacy more as the terminus ad quem than a quo, as a limit on 
the right of privacy rather than a source of it. For instance, in 
Lovisi v. Slayton118 a married couple which had invited a third 
113. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
114. 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
115. "A statute limiting its prohibition on use to persons engaging in the prohibited 
relationship would serve the end posited by Connecticut in the same way, and with the 
same effectiveness, or ineffectiveness •..• " 381 ·u.s. at 507 (White, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
116. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). 
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person to share the intimacies of their bedroom were held to have 
waived their right to privacy, since, "[i]f the couple performs 
sexual acts for the excitation or gratification of welcome onlook-
ers, they cannot selectively claim that the state is an intruder."117 
2. The Home as Sanctuary 
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Stanley v. Georgia that the 
home is a sanctuary within which the individual may pursue his 
intellectual and emotional needs without interference from the 
government except where there is demonstrable external harm. 
Related to the colloquial definition of privacy, and drawing 
constitutional legitimacy from many of the sources discussed in 
the preceding Part, is the proposition that some acts are pro-
tected when performed within the sanctuary of the home. This 
seemed in the early days of the privacy doctrine a promising line 
of reasoning, as Justice Harlan implied while analyzing the Con-
necticut statute which banned the use of contraceptives: "This 
enactment involves what, by common understanding throughout 
the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most funda-
mental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy of the home in its most 
basic sense, and it is this which requires that the statute be sub-
jected to 'strict scrutiny.' " 118 The promise gleamed brightly after 
the Court held in Stanley v. Georgia119 that while "the States 
retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does 
not extend to mere possession [of obscene films] by the individ-
ual -in the privacy of his own home.''120 The attraction of Stanley 
lay in its generous language121 and in its conclusion that while the 
state could normally regulate obscenity without proving "that 
exposure to obscene material would create a clear and present 
danger of anti-social conduct, "122 the state could not, given the 
paucity _of knowledge about obscenity's harmfulness, prohibit its 
possession in the home.123 Some judges and commentators thus 
interpreted Stanley as saying that "socially condemned activity, 
117. 539 F.2d at 351. 
118. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Despite this 
language, Justice Harlan emphasized the home's relationship to privacy rights rather than 
the home's function as sanctuary: "The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of 
family life." 367 U.S. at 551. 
119. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
120. 394 U.S. at 568. 
121. "[A]ppellant is . . • asserting the right . . . to satisfy his intellectual and 
emotional needs in the privacy or"his own home." 394 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
122. 394 U.S. at 567. 
123. 394 U.S. at 566-67. 
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excepting that of demonstrable external effect, is and was in-
tended by the Constitution to be beyond the scope of state regula-
tion when ·conducted within the privacy of the home. " 124 The 
Court, however, has refused to extend Stanley, which it depre-
cated in 1973 as "hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's 
home is his castle' ";125 in obscenity cases it has confined Stanley 
strictly to its facts. 128 •• 
Is the adage that a man's home is his castle as trivial as the 
Court implied? If we are to gauge the fundamentality of a right 
by the "traditions and conscience of our people, " 127 the facility 
with which the phrase comes to mind may be evidence to the 
contrary. Indeed, the phrase evokes Professor Reich's modern for-
mulation of the centuries-old belief that 
[p]roperty performs the function of maintaining independence, 
dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the 
majority has to yield to the owner . . . . [P]roperty affords day-
to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life.128 
Justice Stewart recently cited the classic and august authority for 
the proposition that "rights in property are basic civil rights . . . 
J. Locke ... ; J. Adams ... ; [and] W. Blackstone .... " 129 
And Justice Stevens seemed to be hearkening to this tradition in 
his concurring opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland: "In my 
judgment the critical question presented by this case is whether 
· East Cleveland's housing ordinance is a permissible restriction on 
appellant's right to use her own property as she sees fit."130 In 
the light of this tradition, Stanley gains strength: the home be-
comes a sanctuary in which the individual may explore and ex-
press his intellectual and emotional nature, undeterred by soci-
ety's notions of propriety and orthodoxy, wherever there is no 
"demonstrable external effect." 
This version of Stanley, however, has several drawbacks as 
the source of a right to sexual activity. First, the essential prelimi-
nary question is whether the right to privacy in the home is so 
fundamental that state interests must be strictly scrutinized. 
124. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1976) 
(Merhige, J., dissenting), af{d. mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
125. Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973). 
126. See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) 
and cases cited in Gerety, supra note 29, at 276 n.164. 
127. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
128. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). 
129. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 638, 552 (1972). 
130. 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Stanley's answer seems to be that if the state interest is weak, the 
right of privacy in the home is fundamental. Since the determi-
nant of the strength of the state interest has largely been the kind 
of scrutiny to which it is subjected, 131 one hardly knows where in 
this circle to begin. 
Second, the exception to the right of privacy where there is 
external harm could easily swallow the right; in this case, ironi-
cally, it is difficult to identify principled limits to the limits on 
the right. In Stanley, external harm could only have been caused 
by the corrupting effects of the literature read in the home. The 
Stanley Court's understanding of "harm" was probably influ-
enced by the case's first amendment aspects132 and by the as-
sumption common in first amendment cases that the operation 
of the marketplace adequately combats pernicious ideas. But the 
possible external harms from even the most sequestered sexual 
behavior are quite evident-illegitimate children and venereal 
disease. If external harm includes offense to the public's sensibili-
ties or damage to society's "moral fiber," the exception would be 
virtually unconfinable. The dimensions of the exception are 
blurred by the Court's willingness in Paris Adult Theatre Iv. 
Slaton to concede the legislature the right to act on "various 
unprovable assumptions" about what is necessary to protect 
society's interest in order and morality. 133 
131. See Part ill.A. infra. 
132. Indeed, if Stanley is read with an eye to its first amendment elements, the 
privacy argument practically disappears. The Court began: 
Appellant raises several challenges . . . . We find it necessary to consider only one. 
Appellant argues . • • that the Georgia obscenity statute . . . violates the First 
Amendment, as ma:de applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. For 
reasons set forth below, we agree that the mere private possession of obscene matter 
cannot constitutionally be made a crime. 
394 U.S. at 559. The Court then discussed the leading contemporary obscenity case, Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): "Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent 
•.. erosion [of First Amendment rights]." 394 U.S. at 563. After a paragraph citing 
Griswold and Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead, 394 U.S. at 564, the Court stated: 
"If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a 
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." 
394 U.S. at 565. After adverting again to the right to read and observe what one pleases, 
394 U.S. at 568, the Court commented: 
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal 
Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen 
goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute's 
infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making 
mere possession criminal. 
394 U.S. at 568 n. 11. 
133. 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973). 
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Finally, the frailty of the "home/sanctuary" argument is 
similar to that of the "fourth amendment emanations" argument: 
both fail to identify the special qualities of an activity which 
mandate constitutional protection; neither standing alone ac-
counts for the importance accorded "privacy'' by the Court. As 
the Court suggested in Paris: 
The protection afforded by Stanley . . . is restricted to a place, the 
home. In contrast, the constitutionally protected privacy of family, 
marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just 
concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate 
relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, 
the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard 
the right to intimacy involved.13' 
Is the right to private sexual relations in the home a funda-
mental right, on a par with family, marriage, motherhood, pro-
creation, and child-rearing, and part of our traditions and na-
tional conscience? Probably not. 
3. The Right of Associational Privacy 
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Griswold v. Connecticut and 
from dissents in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno and Belle 
Te"e v. Boraas that freedom of association, which is a necessary 
concomitant to the rights guaranteed by the first amendment, en-
compasses the fundamental right to choose and live with one's 
most intimate associates, one's sexual partners. . 
A constitutionally assured "right of association" has been 
inferred by the Court from the first amendment protection of 
speech and assembly .135 While in ordinary speech "association" 
has broad connotations, "the scope of the associational right . . . 
has been limited to the constitutional need that created it; ob-
viously not every 'association' is for First Amendment purposes 
or serves to promote the ideological freedom that the First 
Amendment was designed to protect."136 However, Justice Doug-
las and Justice Marshall have, usually in dissent, interpreted the 
right more generously, essentially by liberal use of the first 
amendment emanations discerned by Justice Douglas (writing for 
the Court) in Griswold. There Justice Douglas cited the Court's 
protection of "forms of 'association' that are not political in the 
134. 413 U.S. at 66 n.13. 
135. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958). 
136. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 535 (Stewart, J., dissenting), For 
a proposal for a broader interpretation of the right, see Raggi, An Independent Right to 
Freedom of Association, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1977). 
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customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic 
benefit of the members"137 as evidence that some penumbra! 
rights are necessary to make the express guarantees of the first 
amendment "fully meaningful. "138 He noted that the right of as-
sociation is one of the constitutional guarantees which create 
"zones of privacy."139 He concluded by describing marriage as "an 
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or 
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as 
any involved in our prior decisions."140 Thus in Griswold Justice 
Douglas described a right of associational privacy resting on a 
broad reading of the first amendment's aims and securing free-
dom from governmental interference with human relationships 
serving basic social and personal ends. 
The Court's present willingness to apply traditional equal 
protection standards with "bite"141 allowed the_ Court in 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 142 to postpone deciding 
whether this associational right of privacy is "fundamental. In 
that case the Court held that a provision of the Food Stamp Act 
of 1964 excluding households containing unrelated members vio-
lated the equal protection ~arantee of the due process clause of 
the fifth amendment by creating an irrational classification. The 
Court noted, "Under traditional equal protection analysis, a leg.,, 
islative classification must be sustained if the classification itself 
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest,"143 and 
it found that the classification was not rationally related to the 
interest in minimizing fraud. 144 But Justice Douglas's concurring 
opinion suggested that while the provislon "might well be sus-
tained simply as a rational means to prevent fraud, " 145 preventing 
fraud was not so compelling a governmental interest as to support 
137. 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
138. 381 U.S. at 483. 
139. 381 U.S. at 484. 
140. 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added). 
141. Gunther, supra note 11, at 20-21. 
142. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
143. 413 U.S. at 533. 
lM. 413 U.S. at 535-38. The only reference to the privacy issue was a footnote which 
reported that the government had argued in the district court that the classification might 
foster "morality." 413 U.S. at 535 n.7. The district court had cited Griswold, Stanley, and 
Eisenstadt in suggesting that it was doubtful whether this interest would support the 
infringement of "the rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home." 345 F. 
Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972) (emphasis original). The government did not use the 
"morality" argument before the Supreme Court. 413 U.S. at 535 n.7. 
145. 413 U.S. at 542. 
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an invasion of the fundamental right of association: that right 
protects the poor who wish to band together "in households where 
they can better meet the adversities of poverty." 148 He compared 
that right to other peripheral first amendment rights: 
the right to send one's child to a religious school, the right to study 
the German language in a private school, the protection of the 
entire spectrum of learning, teaching, and communicating ideas, 
the marital right of privacy. 
. . . [T]hese peripheral constitutional rights are exercised 
not necessarily in assemblies that congregate in halls or audito-
riums but in discrete individual actions such as parents placing a 
child in the school of their choice. Taking a person into one's home 
because he is poor or needs help or brings happiness to the house-
hold is of the same dignity. 147 
Despite the considerable potential of this language, Douglas 
wrote the majority opinion in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 14" 
which sustained a zoning ordinance limiting land use to one-
family dwellings and defining "family" to exclude households 
with more than two unrelated persons. 149 In one laconic sen-
tence, Douglas denied that any fundamental right, including the 
right to privacy, was implicated. The opinion recounted the 
contention that the ordinance reflected animosity to unmarried 
cohabiting couples, 150 found no evidence for the charge, and said 
in a footnote, "Moreno ... is therefore inapt as there a house-
hold containing anyone unrelated to the rest was denied food 
stamps."151 Finally, Justice Douglas detected no interference 
with "other forms of association, for a 'family' may, so far as the 
ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever it likes."152 
146. 413 U.S. at 541. 
147. 413 U.S. at 542. 
148. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
149. The action was brought by a group of students and a landlord who had rented 
them a house in an area subject to the ordinance. By the time the case reached the Court, 
the students had moved out and the case was moot as to them. 416 U.S. at 10 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). The Court heard and decided the case, however, because the landlord was 
a party to the action; he had standing to chaJlenge the ordinance because the rent he could 
charge for the house depended on how large a group could live there. 416 U.S. at 9. Justice 
Douglas's opinion does not make clear whether the landlord could assert the rights of his 
ex-tenants, or only his own. In any event, Justice MarshaJI in dissent believed that the 
associational rights of the tenants were still in the case. 416 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
150. Because the ordinance only barred households with three or more unrelated 
persons, unmarried couples were not directly affected. 
151. 416 U.S. at 8 n.6. 
152. 416 U.S. at 9. 
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Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion which is the 
clearest judicial statement of an associational privacy right to 
choose one's household companions. He began by arguing that 
the first amendment limits even zoning laws (which the Court has 
traditionally been hesitant to review), since an ordinance confin-
ing an area to adherents of a particular political or religious per-
suasion would be unconstitutional. "Our decisions establish," he 
continued, "that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect 
the freedom to choose one's associates,"153 and he cited cases ex-
tending protection to "modes of association . . . that pertain to 
the social and economic benefit of the [union] members."154 He 
reasoned, "The selection of one's living companions involves sim-
ilar choices as to the emotional, social, or economic benefits to be 
derived from alternative living arrangements."155 He cited privacy 
decisions displaying a special concern with the right to establish 
and be free in a home (Meyer v. Nebraska, 158 Griswold, and 
Stanley), and he added Roe v. Wade, Eisenstadt, Olmstead, and 
Moreno to support his conclusion that 
[t]he choice of household companions-of whether a person's 
"intellectual and emotional needs" are best met by living with 
family, friends, professional associates, or others-involves deeply 
personal considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate rela-
tionships within the home. That decision surely falls within the 
ambit of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.157 
Finally, Justice Marshall invoked Justice Douglas's arguments in 
Moreno in dismissing the proposition that the right of association 
is satisfied by the freedom to invite guests into the home.158 
The Court again rejected an opportunity to expatiate on the 
fundamentality of an associational right of privacy in Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland. 159 The facts of that case evoke almost 
irresistable sympathy for the appellant. Mrs. Moore was a grand-
mother living with her son, his son, and another grandson by a 
different child. This second grandson had come to live with his 
grandmother, uncle, and cousin after his mother's death180 when 
153. 416 U.S. at 15 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)). 
154. 416. U.S. at 15. Justice Marshall cited Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia 
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); 
and Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
155. 416 U.S. at 15. 
156. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
157. 416 U.S. at 16. 
158. 416 U.S. at 17-18. 
159. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
160. 431 U.S. at 497. 
.. 
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he was less than a year old.181 East Cleveland's housing ordi-
nance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to single families and 
defined family in such a way as to forbid the Moores' arrange-
ment.182 When Mrs. Moore failed to comply with a notice of viola-
tion, she was convicted on a criminal charge, fined $25, and sen-
tenced to five days in jail.183 Although the appellant based her 
claim in part on the right of association, the Court's opinion re-
lied on the long procession of privacy cases stating the family's 
privacy rights. Justice Stewart, in a dissent in which Justice 
Rehnquist joined, did evaluate the associational privacy argu-
ment. Stressing the first amendment origins of that right, 184 he 
put Justice Douglas's "penumbra" argument in its most restric-
tive form: "Freedom of asspciation has been constitutionally rec-
ognized because it is often indispensable to effectuation of 
explicit First Amendment guarantees."185 He could find no rela-
tionship between the situation in Moore and the first amend-
ment concern for speech, assembly, press, and religion. He dis-
agreed that "the biological fact of common ancestry necessarily 
gives related persons constitutional rights of association superior 
to those of unrelated persons,"188 and he argued that in any event, 
[ w]herever the outer boundaries of constitutional protection of 
freedom of association may eventually turn out to be, they surely 
do not extend to those who assert no interest other than the gratifi-
cation, convenience, and economy of sharing the same residence. 187 
Described in Justice Stewart's disparaging language, and at 
its least sympathetic extreme, the right of association does seem 
irrelevant to Belle Terre and Moore and does fail to rise to the 
dignity of a fundamental right. Nevertheless, fornication and 
cohabitation statutes ought at least sometimes to be uncon-
stitutional even in terms of a right of association tied closely to 
the first amendment that right emanates from. The proper 
ordering of people's most intimate relationships is a social and 
political, and often religious, issue of the first importance. The 
development and propagation of ideas about such social order-
ing may require an association of the like-minded, experimenting 
161. 431 U.S. at 505 n.16. 
162. 431 U.S. at 496. 
163. 431 U.S. at 497. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed and the Ohio Supreme 
Court denied review. 431 U.S. at 497-98. 
164. See text at note 136 supra. 
165. 431 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added). 
166. 431 U.S. at 535. 
167. 431 U.S. at 535-36. 
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and setting an example, practicing and preaching. The city 
that is set on a hill is an American tradition, one exemplified by 
communities of social and religious reformers associated for mu-
tual support in redesigning society and recruiting_ adherents. 
Unorthodox marital arrangements, from the continence of the 
Shakers, 168 to the polygamy of the Mormons, 169 to the remarkable 
sexual cavalcade of Oneida, typify these communities. 110 (It 
is worth remarking that each of those was organized according 
to and as an expression of profound religious beliefs.171) In their 
more articulate moments, the communes of the 1960s and 1970s 
often followed the tradition.172 This line of argumeijt, of course, 
applies best to self-consciously political, social,. and religious 
groups.173 Any extension of the argument to individual couples 
would depend on the extent to which the relationship sustained 
an essay in social ordering and expressed social or religious be-
liefs. Such extensions would be hampered by the likelihood that 
few cohabitating couples have thought about themselves in 
these terms. While this analysis suggests that Justice Stewart's 
language may go too far in denying any relationship between 
associational privacy and the choice of domiciliary and sexual 
partners, it also suggests that associational privacy does not go 
far _enough to support a fundamental right to choose such com-
panions. 
Is our initial hypothesis thus incorrect? Despite the elo-
quence of Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall, the Court has 
declined Griswold's offer to enhance the scope of the right of 
association, implicitly in Moreno and Moore, explicitly in Belle 
168. A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERll1ENT 147 (1944) (paperback ed. 1962). 
169. Id. at 86-107. 
170. John Humphrey Noyes, the guru of Oneida 
wrote a pamphlet called Slavery and Marriage: "Marriage is not an institution of 
the Kingdom of Heaven, and must give place to Communism . . . . The abolish-
ment of exclusiveness is involved in the love-relation required between all believers 
in Christ." To this end the community instituted complex marriage. Under this 
system every member had sexual access to every other with his or her consent . • . 
but always under "strict regulation and governed by spiritual considerations." ... 
As there was a general feeling that the young should learn from the older, more 
spiritual members, who had reached a higher level of "fellowship," sexual contacts 
usually proceeded along those lines. 
R. KANTER, COlllllllTMENT AND COMMUNlTY 12 (1972). 
171. In keeping with America's role as a refuge for unorthodox opinion, many of these 
utopian communities had come to America from Europe to live and preach. See, e.g., A. 
TYLER, supra note 168, at 140-45. 
172. E.g., Twin Oaks, described in R. KANTER, supra note 170, at 18-21. 
173. But cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.14 (1946) (transportation ofa plural 
284 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:252 
Terre. The limiting principle of the right of association, and 
what spares the Court the task of applying the compelling-state-
interest test to every government regulation of an "association," 
is the right's first amendment rationale. To accept Griswold's 
invitation would probably have been to divorce the right from 
any convincing first amendment logic and thus to remove the 
right's limiting principle. Given the Court's sensible aversion to 
rights without limiting principles and given the precedents in 
associational privacy cases, the hypothesis standing alone is 
constitutionally unconvincing. 
4. The Right of Familial Privacy 
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland that the right of familial privacy established by the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and cases interpreting 
it extends to functional equivalents of the family, including un-
married heterosexual couples. 174 
The rights of familial and marital privacy also draw constitu-
tional authority from the right of association, but they are bol-
stered by other constitutional language and a tradition of consti-
tutional interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. As Justice Goldberg wrote in Griswold, 
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly 
underiie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to mar-
ital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order 
and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected. 17G 
Familial privacy assures more than the unadorned right to raise 
a family; that right is accompanied by the right to autonomy in 
making decisions about the family. 178 Before we can determine 
whether these rights imply a right of unrelated individuals to 
organize a non-traditional "family," we must examine the kinds 
of behavior the Court has insulated from governmental supervi-
sion. 
Familial-privacy cases essentially concern "the parents' 
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of 
their children."177 As one seminal opinion put it: 
wife across· state lines constitutes such transportation for an immoral purpose in contra-
vention of the Mann Act). 
174. Because of its emphasis on functional equivalents of the family, this hypothesis 
could probably apply only to laws prohibiting cohabitation. But see note 216 infra. 
175. 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
176. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFieur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory leave of 
absence for teacher who becomes pregnant violates Constitution). 
177. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring 
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It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child 
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor 
hinder. 178 
Thus the classic familial-privacy cases have buttressed the right 
of parents to control their children's education by invalidating 
laws prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to young chil-
dren179 and laws requiring children to attend public schools. 180 
The Court slightly broadened the scope of familial privacy in 
Moore u. City of East Cleveland, 181 where the Court, emphasizing 
the "sanctity" of the family and its deep roots in our national 
history and mores, announced, "The tradition of uncles, aunts, 
cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along 
with parents and chil9ren has roots equally venerable and equally 
deserving of constitutional recognition [as those of the nuclear 
family]." 182 Governmental interference with "choices concerning 
family living arrangements" therefore must be strictly scruti-
nized. 183 The legitimacy of this constitutional recognition of the 
extended family becomes apparent when we recall that one rea-
son we guard the family is because it is the institution through 
which "we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished 
values, moral and cultural"184 and that decisions concerning rear-
ing children and transmitting values to them have customarily 
been shared by the parents with other relatives. A grandmother's 
right to live with her two grandchildren is protected because she 
serves the parental function of bringing up and socializing the 
children. 
Moore's slight extension of familial privacy was not made 
easily, however. Only four Justices joined in the plurality opinion; 
the concurring opinion, written by Justice Stevens, reasoned that 
the ordinance impermissibly interfered with the appellant's right 
to control her own property and that it therefore was a taking 
without due process or just compensation.185 Chief Justice Burger 
dissented because the appellant had not exhausted her adminis-
in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
639 (1968)). 
178. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
179. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
180. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925). 
181. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
182. 431 U.S. at 504. 
183. 431 U.S. at 499. 
184. 431 U.S. at 503-04. 
185. 431 U.S. at 513-21. 
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trative remedies, but he thought the constitutional question diffi-
cult.188 Justice Stewart's dissent, to which Justice Rehnquist sub-
scribed, contended that the zoning power approved by the Court 
in Euclid u. Ambler Realty Co. 187 and affirmed as to single-family 
zoning plans by Belle Terre carried with it the power to define 
"family." Recalling that the standard for measuring the "limited 
substantive contours"188 of a due process claim was that the inter-
est be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"189 Justice Stew-
art wrote, "The interest that the appellant may have in perma-
nently sharing a single kitchen and a suite of contiguous rooms 
with some of her relatives simply does not rise to that level."190 
He reviewed cases protecting the family's autonomy and found 
little similarity to the appellant's interest: "The ordinance . . . 
did not impede her choice to have or not to have children, and it 
did not dictate to her how her own children were to be nurtured 
and reared. " 191 Justice White's dissent likewise saw no reason why 
the "interest in residing with more than one set of grandchildren 
is one that 9alls for any kind of heightened protection under the 
Due Process Clause."192 
Could Moore's extension of "family" be stretched any 
further? Laurence Tribe argues that decisions denying parents 
and husbands the right to veto a woman's decision to have an 
abortion, 193 when seen in the combined light of the family and 
marital privacy cases, the holding in Moreno, 194 and decisions 
forbidd1ng disadvantaging of illegitimate children and unwed 
-parents195 suggest that 
one cannot avoid the conclusion that the stereotypical "family 
unit" that is so much a part of our constitutional rhetoric is becom-
ing decreasingly central to our constitutional reality. Such 
186. 431 U.S. at 521. 
187. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
188. 431 U.S. at 537 (1977). 
189. 431 U.S. at 537 (citing Roe v. Wade's quotation of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325 (1937)). 
190. 431 U.S. at 537. 
191. 431 U.S. at 536. 
192. 431 U.S. at 549. 
193. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
194. See text at notes 142-44 supra. 
195. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed fathers cannot automati-
cally be presumed unfit); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate child 
cannot be disqualified from wrongful death recovery for death of mother); Glona 
v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (mother of illegitimate child cannot 
be disqualified from wrongful death recovery for death of child) • • • • 
L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 987. n.17. 
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"exercises of familial rights and responsibilities" as remain prove 
to be individual powers to resist governmental determination of 
who shall be born, with whom one shall live, and what values shall 
be transmitted.196 
Even two of the earliest "privacy" cases proclaim the right 
of parents to transmit heterodox values to their children 197 and 
can be seen as protecting a sanctuary for the preservation of 
individual and cultural independence and autonomy. A similar 
interest may also be inferred from the comment in Moore that the. 
"Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its 
children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly 
defined family patterns"198 and from the concurring opinion in 
Moore, which was written 
to underscore the cultural myopia of the arbitrary boundary drawn 
by the East Cleveland ordinance in the light of the tradition of the 
American home that has been /l feature of our society since our 
beginning as a Nation-[the extended family especially common 
in black and ethnic groups).199 
From this perspective, the implication of Moore may be that 
the Constitution protects the family because it functions as a 
sanctuary in which intimate and important relationships are de-
veloped and expressed. If the Constitution's concerp. is the fam-
ily's function, functional equivalents of the family, including 
unmarried couples, ought also to be protected. And the Court in 
dictum intimated a willingness to recognize functional equiva-
lents of the family in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 200 
where it noted that 
the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals in-
volved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments 
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the 
role it plays in "promoting a way of life" through the instruction 
of children ... as well as from the fact of blood relationship.2111 
Nevertheless, is there something about the fact of related-
ness which justifies drawing the constitutional line at the 
196. Id. 987 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (emphasis origi-
nal). 
197. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), protects the parents' right to have the 
child taught a language (German) which society has decided represents·a tradition inimi-
cal to its interests. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), preserves the parents' 
right not to educate their children in that traditional transmitter of our national values, 
the public school. 
198. 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
199. 431 U.S. at 507. 
200. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
201. 431 U.S. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)). 
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"traditional" family? The appellant in Moore, after all, was not 
only in loco parentis, but was so closely related by blood that it 
has been traditional for her to occupy that position. 
Little in the history of the nation or the cases decided by the 
Court is precedent for extending the protection of the family to 
individuals not related by blood or marriage. Thus Smith, whose 
dicta tentatively equated the traditional family and the foster 
family, held that, as against the right of the biological parents, 
foster parents lacked the kind of interest which would require 
heightened scrutiny of statutory arrangements for returning a 
child from foster to biological parents. 202 As the Court noted in 
Smith, "the usual understanding of 'family' implies biological 
relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between 
parent and child have stressed this element."203 And even Moore, 
for all its expansive language, contrasted the situation in Moore 
with that in Belle Terre and identified the overriding distinguish-
ing factor as the regulation of the family in Moore and "only 
unrelated individuals" in Belle Terre. 204 Nor is the emphasis on 
blood relationships wholly irrelevant to the underlying reasons 
for protecting the family. Whichever familial function we single 
out-the family's responsibility for feeding, clothing, and educat-
ing society's young or the family's provision of a sanctuary in 
which intimate relationships may be developed and expressed 
without undue interference by the state-it will be best per-
formed by a stable, identifiable agency. Society's experience is 
generally thought to have been that such an agency is most likely 
to flourish when its members are bound by sentiments and beliefs 
about the ties of blood. 
In summary, while our hypothesis about familial privacy has 
attractive features, it is, standing alone, unpersuasive. 
5. The Right of Marital Privacy 
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from the recognition of marital 
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut and from the explicit attribu-
tion of privacy rights to the individual in Eisenstadt v. Baird that 
the Constitution guarantees both married and unmarried couples 
202. It is quite another [thing] to say that one may acquire such an interest 
in the face of another's constitutionally recognized liberty interest that derives from 
blood relationship, state law sanction, and basic human right-an interest the 
foster parent has recognized by contract from the outset. 
431 U.S. at 846. 
203. 431 U.S. at 843 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
204. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 497, 498 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
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the right to express "the most intimate concerns of an individual's 
personal life" unhindered by governmental regulation. 
Marriage is, of course, the paradigm "privacy" relationship. 
Not only did the first modern privacy opinions-Griswold and 
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe-involve married couples, but 
that fact was central to the several rationales for the privacy right 
in those cases. Both the "unreasonable search" and the 
"association" arguments were enhanced by invocations of so-
ciety's special regard for marriage, most memorably in Justice 
Douglas's rhetorical question about "the sacred precincts of mari-
tal bedrooms."205 
Why does society shield the married couple from the govern-
ment's supervision, and is there any reason unmarried couples 
should not also be shielded? Of course, marriage is a stable, iden-
tifiable institution responsible for raising and socializing chil-
dren. But society protects married couples who have not_ had 
children, who will not have children, or whose children have left 
home. Society does so because marriage is also the institution 
within which a couple can conduct "the most intimate concerns 
of an individual's personal life."206 Intimate emotional ties, ce-
mented by and expressed through sexual relations, are widely 
thought overridingly important and especially vulnerable when 
exposed to the public's gaze. Of course, society has traditionally 
sought to promote and preserve these intimate relationships 
through marriage, as the Court's celebrated pronouncement in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird concedes: "It is true that in Griswold the 
right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship." 
However, that pronouncement continued: 
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind 
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each 
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married 
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
205. Griswold v. Connectic-!)t, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
206. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.-S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the Court reaffirmed the centrality of marriage and the 
fundamental importance of the freedom to enter into it. In that case, the Court declared 
unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute forbidding any Wisconsin resident to marry without 
court permission if he was obligated by a court order to support any minor issue not in 
his custody. 434 U.S. at 375. The Court cited with approval "the leading decision of this 
Court on the right to marry," Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967): "The freedom to 
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men." 434 U.S. at 383. 
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matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.207 
Though that pronouncement's logical relationship to the holding 
in the case was questionable when the case was decided, 20M the 
proposition, has now been so widely cited as to live a life of its 
own. 209 And though Eisenstadt speaks of privacy in the decision 
whether to bear a child, a similarly strong interest in privacy in 
sexual matters has been acknowledged by lower courts.210 Thus, 
in Cotner v. Henry, 211 which overturned a husband's conviction 
on a sodomy charge, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
wrote: "The import of the Griswold decision is that private, con-
sensual, marital relations are protected from regulation by the 
state through the use of a criminal penalty. " 212 The constitutional 
significance of the right to express fully one's personality and 
individuality was detailed by Justice Marshall in his dissent in 
Kelley v. Johnson:213 
An individual's personal appearance may reflect, sustain, and 
nourish his personality and may well be used as a means of ex-
pressing his attitute and lifestyle . . . . To say that the liberty 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass mat-
ters of personal appearance would be fundamentally inconsistent 
with the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal 
integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution was de-
signed to protect.214 
Taking the cases preserving the right of privacy in sexual matters 
together with Eisenstadt, it can be proposed, as the Arizona 
Court of Appeals has, that 
no sound argument can be made that the right of privacy in sexual 
conduct between consenting adults is "fundamental" only when 
the consenting adults are married to each other. The right of pri-
207. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis original). 
208. See text at notes 45-49 supra. 
209. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685-87 (1977). 
210. This Note does not treat judicial attitudes toward the regulation of homosexual-
ity. For a brief attempt to establish a possible distinction between state regulation of 
homosexuality and nonmarital heterosexual activity, see note 225 infra and accompanying 
text. 
211. 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968). 
212. 394 F.2d at 875 (footnote omitted). 
213. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
214. 425 U.S. at 250-51. These comments were made in dissent, but the decision of 
the Court may be at least partly explained in terms of the special difficulties of the case, 
which held that the state has a right to regulate the length of policemen's hair, Given the 
rigidities of the two-tier approach, the Court may have been afraid it would become 
involved in detailed examination of endless minor infringements of a right to regulate 
personal appearance. 
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vacy i~ deemed fundamental because it is basic to the concept of 
the individual in our American culture and because it is a neces-
sary prerequisite to the effective enjoyment of all our other funda-
mental rights. As Eisenstadt and its progeny have recognized, . · 
these reasons are wholly unrelated to the existence vel non of a 
marriage relationship.215 
The argument, then, is this: Marriage exists to facilitate ~he 
expression of emotional and sexual intimacy. That intimacy .is so 
fundamental to individual liberty that it demands constitutjonal 
protection. Nothing is different about the psychological and emo-
tional needs of unmarried couples which would justify denying 
them the same protection:216 
But if society genuinely recognizes the centrality to personal 
liberty of the right to nonmarital sexual relations, would not our 
traditions reflect that recognition? In other words, does this argu7 
ment flunk the "traditions and collective conscience" test?217 It 
does not. First, even when laws confining sex to marriage were 
enforced, they were widely broken, 218 and they have not been 
systematically enforced for years.219 This nonenforcement may 
well amount to the state's tacit concession that its citizens believe 
privacy and autonomy in sexual relations are of paramount im-
portance. 220 In other words, there is a traditional regard for the 
215. State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147, 1151 (1975), revd. sub nom. 
State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976). · 
216. One could respond to this argument by saying that, while the argument might 
justify overturning laws against cohabitation, it cannot justify overturning fornication 
laws, since while living together might be analogous to marriage, a one-night relationship 
hardly is. However, that argument has more formal logic than practical utility. For in-
stance, what would prevent a couple accused of fornication from claiming that; but for 
their arrest, they were beginning a long-term, and therefore protected, relationship. Nor 
does it seem likely that any sensible, workable line could be drawn specifying the number 
of days a couple had to spend together to establish a "marriage-like" relationship. Of 
course, none of this brings into question the permissibility of laws against prostitution, 
since prostitution's commercial element, we societally have assumed, makes the intimacy 
we wish to protect impossible. 
217. See text at notes 71-84 supra. 
218. See notes 2-3 supra. 
219. See note 97 supra. 
220. A national survey commissioned by Time and conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly 
& White found: 
In general, 70% [of the sample] subscribed to the statement that "there 
should be no laws, either federal or state, regulating sexual practice." The majority 
included all categories, Catholic and Protestant alike, old as well as young: Later 
in the survey, when asked whether they favored eliminating or maintaining "laws 
which regulate what kinds of sexual practices are acceptable and legal," a solid 
49%-to-42% plurality wanted them eliminated. · 
The one apparent exception is pornography • • . . No less than 74% supported 
the view that "the Government should crack down more on pornography in movies, 
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importance of sexual relations which has simply not been ex-
pressed in legislation, probably because no cohesive group has a 
powerful motive to work for the repeal of laws which are rarely 
enforced and because there are cohesive groups (often religious) 
which would vehemently oppose repeal. In fact some states have 
repealed fornication and cohabitation statutes,221 alld that ba-
rometer of enlightened legal opinion, the Model Penal Code, 
omitted such provisions.222 Second, while nonmarital sexual ac-
tivity has always been with us, in this century sex has begun to 
be thought the pervasive, underlying human motivation. How-
ever professional psychologists may have revised the original 
Freudian analysis, its essential elements, at least in a vulgarized 
form, have altered our social perspective and elevated the pursuit 
of individual fulfillment through sexual activity to a new dignity. 
Finally, society may have always recognized the fundamental 
importance of the right to sexual expression but believed there 
were reasons for channelling it in marriage. Whether state inter-
ests justify regulation of sexual expression outside of marriage is 
discussed in detail below. 223 
Several of the "rights" discussed in earlier sections lack lim-
iting principles. The right to sexual relations outside of marriage 
suffers only slightly from this defect. Such a right does not inevit-
ably imply a right to whatever "lifestyle" one chooses, since sex 
is a uniquely potent and intimate expression of personality. A 
policeman forbidden to wear long hair has not suffered a diminu-
tion of his ability to express profound emotional needs in a degree 
remotely.approaching that of a person barred from sexual expres-
sion. Nor would a right of sexual expression outside marriage 
necessarily conflict with Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, even 
assuming that that case approves laws prohibiting sodomy,m 
since homosexuality can be distinguished from heterosexuality in 
terms of the very societal traditions which necessitate a right to 
sexual freedom. In other words, homosexuality may fail the 
"traditions and collective conscience" test, since, however 
books and nightclubs. Of these, 54% said they felt this strongly. 
TIME, Nov. 21, 1977, at 115. 
221. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.040 (1970) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1980 by ch. 166, 
§21, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 219); CAL. PENAL CODE § 269a (West 1970) (repealed by ch. 
71 §5, 1975 Cal. Stats. 131); IND. CODE § 35-1-82-2 (1971) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 148, 
§24, 1976 Ind. Acts 718); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-928 (1943) (repealed by Legis. Bill 38, §328, 
1977 Neb. Laws 88). 
222. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment at 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
223. Parts ill.B. -ill.C. infra. 
224. See notes 61-69 supra and accompanying text. 
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wrongly, Americans have long regarded (and still do regard) 
homosexuality with special reprobation.22.5 
We have hypothesized that the right of marital privacy logi-
cally extends to unmarried couples. That hypothesis, this Note 
proposes, is valid. 
6. The Right of Decisional Privacy 
Hypothesis: It may be inferred from Roe v. Wade that individuals 
have a right to make without governmental interference important 
and intimately personal decisions, including the decision to have 
sexual relations outside marriage. 
Roe v. Wade, 226 which established the right to terminate a 
pregnancy, rests on a singularly hazy rationale.227 The Court, cit-
ing the usual privacy cases, concluded, 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the Ninth Amendment's 
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass 
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.22x 
From the discussion following that quotation, one might infer 
that the right grows out of the woman's right to control her own 
body or out of her right to escape the mental and physical distress 
of bearing an unwanted child. 
The familial and marital privacy cases have already been 
discussed.229 A right to control one's person dates from Union 
Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 230 which spoke movingly of common-
law limits on the power of courts to order medical examinations 
of plaintiffs in civil suits.231 In Roe, however, the Court noted that 
it has refused to recognize an unlimited right to control one's own 
225. This is not to deny that there is a tension between, on one hand, establishing a 
right to full sexual expression for most members of society on the grounds that they need 
it to fulfill their individuality, and, on the other, barring the rest from any kind of sexual 
expression which appeals to them. It is to say that, however unjustifiably, homosexuality 
is still widely regarded as a threat to social stability and to psychological health in a way 
that even heterosexual misconduct is not. Homosexuality thus is more difficult to regard 
as cherished by our national traditions and collective conscience. 
226. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
227. See Ely, supra note 51. 
228. 410 U.S. at 153. 
229. Parts II.B.4-5 supra. 
230. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
231. Rules 35 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure moot the question as to 
federal courts. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1944). Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 
U.S. 104 (1964), extended the requirement to submit to a medical examination to all 
parties. 
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body2.12 and doubted that such a right "bears a close relationship 
to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's deci-
sions."2.13 Roe may nevertheless imply a limited right to bodily 
privacy where intimate decisions concerning important aspects of 
one's personality are affected. Thus the decision whether to have 
an abortion may be distinguished, one commentator writes, from 
"a forced needle in the arm, [ which,] while undoubtedly requir-
ing some public justification, may interfere with my autonomy, 
but [which] hardly offends the intimacy of my personal identity 
.... "2.14 This limiting principle provides a sensible if somewhat 
imprecise stopping place for what would otherwise be an illimit-
able and implausible right. 
That a woman to whom an abortion is forbidden suffers can-
not by itself justify the decision in Roe-even wise laws may 
cause distress. The relevance of the hardships listed by the 
Court2.15 is that they are so great and so intimately personal that 
they bring abortion within that category of privacy defined by the 
Court in Whalen v. Roe236 as "the interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions." The Court reiter-
ated the centrality of the freedom to make a decision in private 
matters in Carey v. Population Services International. z:17 As the 
dissenting member of the three-judge panel in Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney wrote, 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Due Pro-
cess Clause . . . protects the right of individuals to make personal 
choices, unfettered by arbitrary and purposeless restraints, in the 
private matters of marriage and procreation. Roe v. Wade . , . Doe 
v. Bolton . . . Griswold v. Connecticut . . . . I view those cases 
as standing for the principle that every individual has a right to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's deci-
sions on private matters of intimate concern. A mature individ-
232. 410 U.S. at 155 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccina• 
tion); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization)). 
233. 410 U.S. at 155. 
234. Gerety, supra note 29, at 275 n.153. 
235. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy 
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and phys-
ical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, 
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child 
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other 
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed 
motherhood may be involved. 
410 U.S. at 153. 
236. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). 
237. 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977). 
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ual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her 
own home, would appear to me to be a decision of the· utmost 
private and intimate concern.238 
Like the woman's decision in Roe, the decision to engage in non-
marital sexual relations "pertain[s] to ... one's deepest na-
ture";239 may, if improperly resolved, inflict significant psycholog-
ical damage; involves complex circumstantial and ethical prob-
lems perhaps best evaluated by the individual rather than the 
state;240 and implicates the kinds of basic human relationships of 
which the Court has been solicitous. 
Given these similarities, the hypothesis is plausible. Never-
theless, as the vagueness and frailty of the rationale in Roe sug-
gest, the absence of precise criteria for identifying protected deci-
sions might discourage the Court from developing this right and 
should cause us to doubt that this hypothesis creates a 
fundamental right. 
There remains the logical inference from the decisions ban-
ning state interference with t}J.e use of contraceptives and abor-
tion: What is the point of a right to use contraceptives and have 
abortions without the right to sexual intercourse? Members of the 
Court have denied that their decisions have settled the ques-
tion. 241 However, a persuasive resolution of any conflict may be 
inferred from the Court's comment in a somewhat different con-
text in Carey u. Population Services International: 
"It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that [the state] has 
prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child [ or the 
physical and psychological dangers of an abortion] as punishment 
for fornication." We remain reluctant to attribute any such 
"scheme of values" to the state.242 
To put it another way, we may say that (with some qualifications) 
the Court has forbidden states to prevent citizens from using 
contraceptives or having abortions, not because the Court ap-
proves of using contraceptives or abortions or because it approves 
238. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. i975) (Merhige, J., dissenting), affd. mem., 
425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
239. Definition #2 of intimate, THE AMErucAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE '686 (1969). 
240. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 933: 
Regarded therefore as part of a series of decisions allocating to the woman the 
essentially unfettered choice of whether to bear a child, Roe v. Wade represents less 
of a decision in favor of abortion than a decision in favor of leaving the matter . . . 
to women rather than to legislative majorities . . .. So understood, the abortion 
decision again seems less problematic than it might otherwise appear. 
241. See text at note 62 supra. 
242. 431 U.S. 678, 695 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)). 
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of the act which makes them necessary, but because such laws 
intrude harshly on personal autonomy by increasing the likeli-
hood that the female partner would have to bear, and the couple 
raise, a child. However, the physical, emotional, and financial 
imposition of laws prohibiting fornication and cohabitation are so 
much milder than those of laws prohibiting contraception and 
abortion that it is not possible to say that the Court's disapproval 
of the latter requires it to disapprove the former. 
C. "Sexual Privacy" as a Fundamental Right 
The preceding pages have argued that a fundamental right 
of sexual privacy may be inferred from the right of marital pri-
vacy. They have also argued that several other lines of reasoning 
support a right to sexual privacy, but not convincingly enough to 
persuade us that such a right is fundamental. The presence of 
these other lines of reasoning, however, reinforces the inference 
from marital privacy cases of a fundamental right to sexual pri-
vacy. For while we have examined each line of argument sepa-
rately, we must never forget that it is a whole constitution we are 
expounding. The recurring concern in constitutional interpreta-
tion for individual autonomy in intimate and personal decisions 
reinforces our conclusion that the right of sexual privacy is among 
the "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' " 243 
and is therefore fundamental. 
Indeed, for the Justice who has, outside of dictum, spoken 
most directly on our problem, it is this general, recurring pattern 
which apparently dictated his conclusion that, in a state which 
had no law against fornication or cohabitation, a public library 
could not fire an employee for living with a man to whom she was 
not married and their illegitimate child. In dissenting from a 
denial of certiorari in Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 244 
Justice Marshall wrote: "Although we have never demarcated the 
precise boundaries of [the right to privacy], we have held that 
it broadly encompasses 'freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life."245 He then cited privacy cases from 
most of the categories this Note has analyzed.246 
243. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quot• 
ing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
244. 99 S.Ct. 734 (1978). See note 21 supra. 
245. 99 S.Ct. at 736. 
246. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 636, 639-640 
(1974)(pregnancy). See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), and Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-385 (1978)(marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
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III. "SEXUAL PRIVACY" AND THE STATE INTERESTS 
A. The Proper Measure of the State Interests 
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has 
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by 
a "compelling state interest" ... and that legislative enactments 
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state inter-
ests at stake. m 
The Court has generally accepted this measure of the governmen-
tal interest necessary to sustain an infringement of a 
"fundamental right," but it is common learning that the formula 
has meant something slightly different than the words denote, 
since almost without exception, where the Court has judged a 
right fundamental, it has judged the governmental interest not to 
be compelling.248 Roe v. Wade is an exception: in the later stages 
of pregnancy compelling state interests override a woman's fun-
damental right to choose an abortion. The legitimacy of the inter-
ests in Roe-the state's interest in "potential life" and in the 
mother's health-was well established. State interests have typi-
cally been found noncompelling not because the interest is imper-
missible, but because the means chosen do not narrowly, or even 
genuinely, promote that interest.249 The outcome-determinative 
quality of the procedure has been widely criticized as excessively 
rigid and an impediment to sensitive decisions; in equal protec-
tion cases, where the Court has traditionally used an analogous 
formula, the Court may have become more flexible. 250 At present, 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 453-454; id., at 460, 463-465 (White J., concurring in result), and Carey 
v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977)(contraception); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 
399 (child rearing and education); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973) (abor-
tion); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(right to determine family living arrangements). 
99 S.Ct. at 736. 
247. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
248. Justice Powell describes the compelling state interest test as "so severe that 
legislation rarely can meet it." Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 705 (1977). 
249. See, e.g., Justice White's concurring opinion in Griswold: "I wholly fail to see 
how the ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples in any way reinforces the 
State's ban on illicit sexual relationships," and his subsequent dissection of the state's 
claim to the contrary. 381 U.S. at 505-07. 
250. The foremost critic and chronicler of the Court's handling of the fundamental 
rights/compelling state interest problem is Professor Gerald Gunther. See Gunther, supra 
note 11. Justice Marshall has been an outspoken advocate on the Court of a more flexible 
approach in this area. See, e.g., his dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973). 
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however, the elements of a "compelling" state interest are ill 
defined, and classifying state interests is -a hazardous enterprise. 
B. The State Interests 
This Part first examines the state interests fornication and 
cohabitation statutes may serve and asks whethel' those interests 
are "compelling." The Part then scrutinizes the statutes in light 
of the constitutional requirement that they actually further a 
compelling interest. 
1. Prevention of Illegitimacy 
The state has what must surely be a compelling interest in 
preventing the birth of illegitimate children as a means of pro-
tecting children from the disadvantages which often accompany 
illegitimacy. 251 These disadvantages include the stigma which 
society has, however unjustly, assigned to illegitimate children. 
But what is more important is that illegitimate children are prob-
ably more frequently than legitimate children deprived of the 
stable emotional and financial support which the state-
supervised family is supposed to provide. That this interest is 
appropriate seems clear, since these children cannot protect 
themselves. That the interest is compelling also seems clear, since 
no other entity than the state can be relied on to protect them. 
Of course, children born out of wedlock may be well cared for 
by their parents, and of course states could attempt to promote 
this interest by passing and enforcing laws strictly requiring all 
parents to assume complete responsibility for the well-being of 
their children. But when those who are responsible for a child are 
identified before the child is born, when that identification is 
made without the necessity of legal action (as in a bastardy pro-
ceeding), and when there are no social pressures on the parents 
not to acknowledge the child, the state is far better situated to 
ensure proper care for the child, and the child is far more likely 
to receive it. For example, the interests of children of unmarried 
couples are not protected by a court when the parents separate. 
In addition, it is a reasonable hypothesis that many couples who 
do not marry decide not to do so because they doubt they will 
want to live together permanently, and that children born to such 
couples would be more likely than the children of married parents 
251. But see Comment, All in the "Family": Legal Problems of Communes, 7 HAnv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. R.Ev. 393, 408-10 (1972). 
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to suffer the unhappiness of having only one parent.252 Finally, if 
these suppositions ·about the relative vulnerability of illegitimate 
children to social and financial distress are correct, such children 
are more likely than legitimate offspring to burden the state fisc. 
2. Preservation of the Family 
The importance of the family is conceded, even glorified, by 
the cases holding that familial privacy is a fundamental right. If 
the family is as crucial a social institution as those cases and the 
arguments in Parts II. B. 4-5 suggest, the state has a compelling 
interest in preserving it. In view of these cases, and as the discus-
sion above of the problems of illegitimate children illustrates, the 
family performs several basic societal functions, most notably 
raising children. 253 The state's interest in protecting its "agent" 
is plain. 
3. Health 
The present high incidence of venereal disease obv,iously and 
seriously threatens health, especially the health.of the adolescent. 
If enforced, laws prohibiting nonmarital sexual activity would, by 
reducing the number and promiscuity of sexual encounters, pre-
sumably decrease the incidence of the disease. The legitimacy 
of the state interest is attested to (though that legitimacy seems 
clear enough) by the common conditioning of the fundamental 
right to marry on blood tests for venereal disease.25~ The state's 
interest is compounded by the danger to children of parents who 
have a venereal disease. Preserving the public's health is among 
the classic police powers, was recognized as compelling in Roe v. 
Wade, 255 and should be compelling in this context. 
4. Morality 
The state's interest in promoting "morality," including sex-
252. This does seem a reasonable hypothesis. But neither is it an unreasonable hy-
pothesis that children also suffer whose parents stay together only because of pressures 
the state imposes on them. In other words, we are again reminded how intractable the 
Court must find the task of assaying the state's interests. 
253. "The state's interest in fostering marriage as a device for record-keeping and for 
establishing and enforcing domestic and financial responsibilities is not insignificant. The 
interest in preserving the traditional family unit as the basic functioning unit of society 
has also been lauded .... " Note, supra note 22, at 739. 
254. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (dictum). 
255. 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). 
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ual morality, is another classic police power. As Justice Harlan 
wrote in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman: 
the very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns 
indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physi-
cal well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned 
itself with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to 
attempt a line between public behavior and that wbich is purely 
consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community con-
cern a range of subjects with which every society in civilized times 
has found it necessary to deal. 256 
The Court recently confirmed in an obscenity case that "a legisla-
ture could legitimately act . . . to protect 'the social interest in 
order and morality.' "257 However, the Court discerned no funda-
mental rights in that case, so it did not need to decide whether 
the state interest in morality is compelling. 
Given the Court's disposition not to find an interest compel-
ling in the face of a fundamental right, and given the arguments 
that follow in this paragraph, the state interest in "morality" 
should not be found compelling in the context of sexual privacy. 
First, even the most ardent modern advocate of "the enforcement 
of morals,"258 Lord Devlin, limited the state's scope: 
It is not nearly enough to say that a majority dislike a practice; 
there must be a real feeling of reprobation . . . . [I]t can be 
argued that if [intolerance, indignation, and disgust] or some-
thing like them are not present, the feelings of society cannot be 
weighty enough to deprive the individual of freedom of choice,25° 
That depth of feeling as to fornication and cohabitation has ap-
parently been lost. 260 Second, if the fundamental right to sexual 
privacy is based on the individual's right to determine the pro-
priety of a sexual relationship, is not the state excluded from the 
decision at least as to morality ex hypothesi? That is, does not 
the right of sexual privacy (as we have defined it) necessarily 
imply that the morality of an adult heterosexual relationship is 
a question which may be decided by the parties themselves? Is 
not the purport of the fundamental right that when the opinion 
256. 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961). 
257. Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 668, 
572 (1942) (emphasis added by the Court in Roth)). 
258. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). His foremost antagonist is 
H.L.A. Hart, writing in LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). The classic statements of the 
debate are J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), and J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 
(1837). 
259. P. DEVLIN, supra note 268, at 17. 
260. See notes 97 & 220-21 supra. 
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of a legislature and the individual conflict on an issue of 
(hetero-)sexual privacy, the decision and its moral consequences 
are the individual's to choose? Could there be a fundamental 
right to make what in the eyes of the state is an immoral choice? 
Would not a right which permitted such a choice fail the "tra-
ditions and collective conscience" test?261 Third, despite the far 
more troubling moral aspects of the decision to have an abortion, 
the Court in Roe v. Wade did not mention any state interest in 
regulating morality. May we not infer that the Court saw no 
compelling interest in morality to be weighed against the 
woman's privacy right, and that, a fortiori, 262 no such interest 
outweighs the right to sexual privacy? 
C. An Evaluation of the State Interests 
The above paragraphs suggest that three governmental inter-
ests are "compelling"-the interests in deterring illegitimacy, 
preventing disease, and preserving the family. Do fornication and 
cohabitation statutes actually serve these interests? The answer 
depends on an analysis of the statutes' effectiveness which a court 
is ill-equipped to make. These laws are intended to deter conduct 
already discouraged by societal, nonlegal sanctions and pres-
sures, and it must always be difficult to discern whether that 
behavior which is deterred is deterred by the law or by mores. A 
legislature might commission studies gauging the laws' effective-
ness or the effectiveness of alternative, less offensive laws; a court 
cannot. Were the privacy right not fundamental, surely the Court 
would defer in so uncertain a field to the superior facilities of the 
state legislature and to its sense, politically informed, of the wis-
est balance of the competing interests. However, the right is fun-
damental, and the Court must, in the absence of unusually 
wealthy, industrious, and ingenious litigants, speculate on sev-
eral difficult empirical problems. 
It might be first argued that, while the functions the family 
is thought to serve must be performed in some way, the family 
261. Against this reasoning it might be said that it collapses the fundamental right 
and compelling state interest tests. It does so, however, only as to the state interest in 
morality, for while the state can acknowledge that some kinds of decisions so intimately 
affect an individual that only he can make moral choices about them, it is not conceivable 
that the state could be asked £o ignore its obligations to protect the young, to prevent the 
spread of disease, and to maintain social stability. Thus it will always be proper to ask if 
a fundamental right conflicts with those obligations. 
262. It is a fortiori because the issues of when life begins and what constitutes ending 
it are societally and personally more serious than issues of sexual morality. 
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may not be needed to perform them (and hence that fornication 
statutes are not necessary to serve that compelling purpose). 
Some of those who break cohabitation and fornication laws have 
done and will do so because they believe that the family should 
be replaced as the primary unit of social organization.263 Never-
theless, our societal.esteem for the family is so de~ply engrained, 
the Court's cases are so thoroughly agreed in approving that es-
teem, and, especially, the empirical questions are so recalcitrant, 
that the Court should affirm that protecting the family is a com-
pelling state interest. 
Nevertheless, precisely how fornication laws further that 
state interest is rarely explained. The theory is apparently this: 
The importance of marriage and the family is recognized symboli-
cally, and those institutions are made more attractive, by re-
stricting the privileges of sexual relations and raising a family to 
them. The accuracy of this theory is unclear-making the privi-
lege of sexual relations contingent upon marriage may only en-
courage people to marry when their primary motive is not to 
produce a stable family but to enjoy the privilege; making trial 
marriages impossible might only keep single those who would be 
excellent parents and spouses. And if fornication and cohabita-
tion laws _are truly part of a system of legislation regarding the 
family and sexual conduct which symbolically and practically 
nurtures marriage and the family, why do states typically fail to 
take such laws seriously?264 Further, the state has constitutionally 
inoffensive, and possibly more effective, ways of furthering this 
interest, as through tax incentives. Thus the state interest in the 
family offers scant justification for retracting the conclusion in 
the preceding Part that laws criminalizing fornication and co-
habitation are constitutionally impermissible. 
The state interests in preventing illegitimacy and venereal 
disease can be discussed together, since they raise substantially 
the same problems of enforcement. If laws prohibiting sex be-
tween unmarried people were effectively enforced they would, of 
course, prevent the birth of illegitimate children and decrease 
venereal disease. If, however, legislation less violative of privacy 
rights could be contrived, it would be constitutionally preferable. 
But the possible alternatives are likely to be ineffective, offensive, 
or both. The least offensive alternative would be an educational 
263. See, e.g., text at notes 168-73 supra. 
264. See note 97 supra. For a somewhat fuller treatment of this question, see text at 
notes 271-73 infra. 
.. 
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program, but even the most vigorous education would probably 
be ineffectual, unless we are to credit the theory that most illegiti-
mate ·births and instances of venereal disease result from igno-
rance of contraceptives and prophylactics or of how to obtain 
them. (Given the psychological reasons people do not use contra-
ceptives, the exigencies of passion, and the perennial optimism 
of human nature, this seems unlikely.) If the cogent, insistent, 
and frightening arguments of the Surgeon General and the Amer-
ican Cancer Society cannot dissuade us from tobacco, what hope 
is there for governmental preaching about an even more compel-
ling vice? (Many schools already have sex education courses. If 
illegitimacy and venereal disease are now rife, how effectively do 
these courses discourage illicit, or at least incautious, sexual 
activity?) The Court might also wonder about the side effects of 
such a program and about society's willingness to adopt it. Might 
an active public campaign offend the many members of the pub-
lic to whom public discussions of sex, illegitimacy, and venereal 
disease are vulgar and disturbing?265 And in this especially sensi-
tive area, might a parent be able to object that sex-education 
programs in schools violate their familial-privacy right to control 
their children's education? 
Other alternatives are also offensive or constitutionally im-
permissible. States have hitherto relied on fear of nature's own 
sanctions-disease and children-to deter sexual carelessness. 
But the Court's decisions in the abortion and contraceptives cases 
have prohibited the state from strengthening those sanctions by 
denying its citizens contraceptives and abortions. States have 
also disadvantaged illegitimate children in the hope of encourag-
ing couples to reproduce only within marriage, but the Court has 
also disapproved this tawdry device.266 Constitutional difficulties 
aside, programs to punish parents of illegitimate children or vic-
tims of venereal disease could only be counterproductive. Pun-
ishing parents would defeat the purpose of deterring illegitimacy 
(that is, insuring psychologically and financially secure homes for 
children). Punishing those with venereal disease would cripple 
programs to find and treat victims. 
If there are no acceptable alternatives to fornication and co-
habitation statutes as means of preventing disease and illegiti-
macy, we must confront the question-whether these laws them-
265. Compare this with the state's legitimate interest in "the quality of life and the 
total community environment." Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973). 
266. E.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973). 
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selves work in fact, not just in theory. The Court, we have seen, 
cannot reliably answer that question, but it should be able to 
make a shrewd guess that these laws are simply unenforceable. 
Even in Colonial America, where laws forbidding fornication had 
far more public support, they were not successfully enforced.207 As 
Bentham expressed the difficulty: "With what ch.ance of success 
. . . would a legislator go about to extirpate drunkenness and 
fornication, by dint of legal punishment? Not all the tortures 
which ingenuity could invent would compass it . . . . " 208 And 
even in sexually repressive Victorian England, even the leading 
spokesman for law as an expression of morality conceded in 
speaking of fornication statutes: 
A law which enters into a direct contest with a fierce imperious 
passion, which the person who feels it does not admit to be bad, 
and which is not directly injurious to others, will generally do more 
harm than good; and this is perhaps the principal reason why it is 
impossible to legislate directly against unchastity, unless it takes 
forms which every one regards as monstrous and horrible. 260 
Modern scholars share this skepticism.27° Finally, may not the 
Court look to the behavior of the states which pass and would 
have to defend such laws to see how much faith they have in and 
how much they rely on these laws? Fornication and cohabitation 
statutes are rarely enforced; when they are, it is often for reasons 
other than to accomplish the ends by which the state defends 
them.271 Apparently the states themselves doubt either the effi-
cacy or the necessity of these laws. 
This is not to say, of course, that states have chosen not to 
enforce these laws explicitly because of that doubt. The decision 
not to enforce is more likely to be made by local officials and for 
many reasons. The police have limited resources and may wish 
to spend those resources enforcing the many more serious crimes 
which have more clearly harmful effects and which there is more 
popular sentiment and even agitation for enforcing. Police may 
also be influenced by the general respectability of many of the 
267. Flaherty, Law and Morals in Early America, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 244 (1971). 
268. Quoted in id. at 250. 
269. J. STEPHEN, supra note 258, at 152 (1967 ed.) (first published in 1837), 
270. E.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 312 (1968 paperback ed.), 
271. See note 97 supra. The drafters of the Model Penal Code reached a similar 
conclusion. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 C0LUM, L. REv. 669, 
674 (1963). Of course, if a state did choose to enforce these laws systematically, it would 
be possible to study more productively their effectiveness, and these inferences from the 
state's inaction would not have to be relied on. 
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people who break fornication and cohabitation laws, by the feel-
ing that when a law has fallen so thoroughly into desuetude it 
would be unfair to enforce it (especially with the selectivity which 
would presumably be necessary in some jurisdictions), and, possi-
bly, by some sense that only he who is without guilt should be 
casting stones. But what these reasons have in common is the 
assumption that the need to enforce these laws is exceedingly 
mild and that, given the usual choice of enforcing these laws or 
serving one of the many competing interests, the competing inter-
est prevails. 272 That result hardly comports with the contention 
that these laws effectively serve a compelling state interest. 
One might respond that those laws also serve which stand 
and wait-that these laws by their presence on the books are a 
symbolic expression of society's attitude toward nonmarital sex-
ual activity. But what citizen could take as a serious statement 
of community sentiment a law the community allowed to be so 
often flouted? Further, the chance that these laws serve as any 
such statement is diminished by the fact that a number of people 
do not even know such laws exist. 273 
In sum, since a fundamental right is diminished by laws 
forbidding fornication and cohabitation, and since the states 
themselves, who are in a position to know, tacitly concede the 
inefficacy of such laws, the Court would be justified in finding 
that they do not serve a compelling state interest, and declaring 
them unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Over these complexities broods the specter of Lochner and 
the problems of constitutional interpretation it represents. Those 
problems are more than usually perplexing for this Note's topic. 
Each of the steps in the argument that laws prohibiting fornica-
tion and cohabitation are unconstitutional is uncertain. In dis-
cussing whether the privacy right includes what we have called 
sexual privacy, the Court is trapped between the Scylla of a defi-
nition of privacy too narrow to protect important rights and the 
Charybdis of a definition too broad to be meaningful or wise. 
To ward off judicial subjectivity, the Court has devised sev-
eral tests to be used in evaluating a privacy right. But each of 
272. While the privacy in which the crime is customarily committed and the scarcity 
of complainants may partly account for the nonenforcement of fornication laws, neither 
problem would hinder enforcement of cohabitation statutes. 
273. See note 97 supra. 
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these tests, at least when applied to the right of sexual privacy, 
presents difficulties, for essentially each asks the Court to iden-
tify and gauge society's temper and values. This is an enterprise 
which, while inescapable in this and many other areas of consti-
tutional jurisprudence, requires the Court to ask empirical ques-
tions it has neither the tools nor the training to answer. These 
questions arise in applying the national conscience and traditions 
test, in deciding why society accords privacy rights to certain 
kinds of relationships and decisions, in determining whether sex-
ual privacy is sufficiently analogous to other kinds of privacy that 
it too should be a right, and in assessing whether fornication and 
cohabitation statutes or some drastic alternative to them work. 
It was, one may suppose, the failure to perceive correctly society's 
temper and values that eventually caused the Lochner Court to 
founder. 
